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Preliminaries and Caveats 
 
The astute reader might notice my insistence on the use of “liberal modernity” as my preferred 
shorthand for a set of social concepts and forces. In a work that necessarily involves relationships 
between oppressed people and oppressors, I think it important to be as clear as I can in describing 
people and forces in ways that are dignifying and affirming. On both sides, there is some 
responsibility, while there are also people’s complicated, unique, and legitimate humanities. In no 
way am I interested in determining (unilaterally—colonially, even) what anyone in any situation 
should have done. In my heart of hearts, I do not think anyone to be a better or worse person than 
anyone else. I tend to think that we all respond to the situations of our lives by grappling with 
conflicting urges  and concerns while trying to produce best-possible outcomes for ourselves, 
necessitating that we produce best-possible outcomes for those around us. 
This should not be read as the presumption of some even-Steven rationalization of everything 
that has happened. Surely, we can agree that some outcomes are unacceptable, regardless of how 
we feel about the motivations of those involved. Some liberal modern forces have been 
unequivocally oppressive and otherwise problematic. 
Liberal modernity is surely not the modernity produced by indigenous people in Perú or by 
Nepali Buddhist monks. Here, we run into a predictable problem. That is, any argument that 
claims that the nature of language to be a problem is an argument that begins to eat itself. The 
same might be said for arguments of situatedness. What I mean is that, on one hand, my use of 
language to argue that language can be a political problem is one that, itself, can become 
misunderstood and produce an unintended politics. On the other hand, I, as a white, cisgender, 
heterosexual, English-speaking, 21st century man in the US necessarily embody certain political 
 9 
realities that make it impossible for me to immediately see certain arguments. Any use of language 
is open to some interpretation and any subjectivity is incomplete.1 
My solution is a poor one, but like language itself, it seems to be the best possible option that I 
can come up with. In “liberal modernity,” I think of a complex constellation of forces having to do 
with rationality, individualism, comminutions of various sorts2, valorization of science, free market 
economy, Judeo-Christian ethics, and so on. The problem with any term like this is that none of 
these features in particular need be present in order for a phenomenon to qualify as liberal modern, 
but some degree of intensity of some combination of any of these might lead to such a 
characterization. 
Similarly, when I talk about liberal modern science, psychology, or medicine, it is surely not 
all science, psychology, or medicine to which I direct attention. Psychology and medicine are here 
just specifications of the scientific spirit. In liberal modernity, science is presumed to have the ability 
to provide answers for how the world works, and when science produces knowledge, we take 
science as the ultimate authority. A couple interesting points arise here. First, it is not actual science 
that seems to be the problem. Instead, it is about a kind of anti-scientific ideology that precedes 
scientific acts and a similar anti-scientific ideology that accompanies products of science. What I 
mean is that science is largely about doubt3, whereas the ideology around science is largely 
dogmatic. This is partly because of science’s own success. Because of the obvious power of 
science—visible through various technologies that pervade our lives, for instance—science is 
compelling as an arbiter of truth. Even in scientific communities, the fact that most of what is done 
                                                        
1 For a discussion on how one might go about defining a term like “modernity,” see Gustavo 
Benavides’s “modernity.” 
2 Mind from body, subject from object, human from nature, individual from community, etc. 
3 Karl Popper’s “falsificationism” can serve as strong evidence for this conception of liberal modern 
science. 
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is what Thomas Kuhn refers to as “normal science” makes it less clear what is the proper role of 
doubt in contemporary liberal modern science.4 
Modernity, science, religion, schools of Buddhist thought, happiness, and all other categories 
are necessarily incomplete, blurry, non-essentialist, distorted versions of the phenomena that they 
are intended to capture. The same could be said of this work or of any other communicative 
expression. All these expressions fray at their edges, their meanings shift over time and according 
to the reader. The work that is done to define and complicate terms is important and challenging. 
My project takes this seriously without being overly constrained by these concerns. As such, there 
are surely opportunities to complicate, and to introduce greater nuance to, my thought. I 
unilaterally, modernistically, colonially totalize and essentialize some concepts in order to avoid 
the deconstructionist mire that is surely, and inconveniently, necessary if one wishes to try to be 
completely honest and forthright in their observations. 
These phenomena are geographically and temporally bounded, but even within those bounds, 
particularities tend to run afoul of any rigid definition. While there are Burmese sciences, Latin 
American Buddhisms, African modernities, and so on, my hope is that I am clear enough in my 
attempts to constrain my analysis. Mostly, this work aims to problematize liberal modern forces in 
the US and Europe, as they are articulated to liberal modern Buddhist social movements. I will, at 
times, refer to the relationships between these movements and Asian Buddhisms. My reason for 
doing so is to highlight liberal modern forces that originate in Transatlantic geographies and that 
impose themselves on—albeit often with some complicity from—non-Transatlantic receivers, 
accepters, transformers, reconceivers, and so on. 
                                                        
4 Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996. 
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On an unrelated note, in my attempt to give reverence to those for whom gender pronouns is 
a complicated and problematic fact of contemporary life, I will (perhaps in some defiance of some 
conceptions of modern grammatical conventions) defer to using “them,” “them,” “their,” 
“themselves,” and so on when in doubt or when referring to non-descript imagined persons. 
Finally, I will not use the common metonym “American” to refer to US citizens. I avoid 
“American” because many people in the Americas lay claim to Americanness. The unmarked 
“American” category, as a signifier for the US citizen, erases many Native Americans and Latin 
Americans from discourses of “American” culture, “American” geography, “American” history, 
and so on.
 Introduction: 
The Colonial in Liberal Modern Utopia 
 
There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. — Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”1 
 
Historians sometimes talk about the long 1968. During the period from roughly the mid-1950s 
until the mid-1970s, a growing social consciousness emerged, reaching its apparent peak in the 
summer of 1968. Other worlds seemed possible. Many people wanted to break free from the 
doldrums of monotonous working urban life. They wanted something other than their anxious, 
alienated, stale boredom. They wanted real freedom to express individuality and to discover their 
authentic selves. 
In people’s searches for new ways of being, they looked for alternatives already in place. They 
wanted new ideologies, new ways of thinking, new ways of feeling, new ways of behaving. Like the 
supposed “virgin lands” that were to be colonized in previous centuries, the foreign was again the 
site of intrigue—full of promise, full of opportunity. What would be mined from Orientalized 
cultures, though, would be thoughts and practices, rather than resources of the earth and of human 
corporeal products. 
As people like Aníbal Quijano, Gustavo Esteva, Walter Mignolo, and Arturo Escobar have 
argued, the cultural conditions that allow for appropriation, recontextualization, and 
transformation of thought and practice can be defined as coloniality. It is not simply that 
                                                        
1 Benjamin, Walter. “On the Concept of History.” Walter Benjamin Selected Writings Vol. 4. 
Cambridge: MA. 1966. 392. 
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colonization is a material practice; instead, coloniality marks the linguistic and institutional process 
by which something from the other becomes a potential tool to be apprehended for one’s own 
purposes. The conditions that made coloniality possible were also conditions that were constructed, 
and, in large part, the residue of those constructions remain as constituent aspects of contemporary 
liberal modern culture. 
1968 was a time of experimentation and far-flung searching for liberatory cultural tools, but 
this was the proposed liberation of the liberal modern, autonomous, independent, egoistic, colonial 
subject—not the liberation of all humankind from oppressions wrought by coloniality, liberal 
modernity, and capitalism. If there was to be a revolution, it would first serve the well-to-do, 
educated Transatlantic subject before there might be any possibility of liberation for the poor, 
uneducated, and/or non-European. 
So, when the Europeans and those from the US made their way to the Middle East, to 
Southeast Asia, to Latin America, and elsewhere, it was not in order to gain some authentic 
alternative to liberal modern culture. Instead, it was to wrench away tools for the kind of cultural 
revolution that could be imagined by, and for, these liberal modern subjects, even if the revolution 
might include a turn toward some alternative practices. 
Buddhist Economics and mindfulness were two liberatory outgrowths from Asian Buddhisms. 
They came about thanks to interactions between Asian Buddhists and well-to-do, educated 
Transatlantic travelers. In each case, they appropriated what fit their liberatory projects and left 
the rest outside what they conceived of as liberal modernity. At least, that is how these projects initially 
went. As it turned out, the effects of the US mindfulness movement altered Buddhisms in Asia. 
My project’s aim is double. By tracing the effects of Orientalism and coloniality through 
contemporary Transatlantic movements that came from Buddhism, I hope to make clear, and 
draw attention to, the cultural conditions that spawned these liberal modern, supposedly liberatory, 
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movements. This project then aims to produce a narrow kind of historiography of liberal modern 
Buddhistic subversive phenomena. That narrowness is, in part, the product of my focus on 
Buddhist Economics and the US mindfulness movement. My other aim is to take note of how 
culture can determine aspects of social movements that aim to improve the social world. There 
surely are problems that plagued many of the movements of 1968, and many of those problems 
appear in Buddhist Economics and in the US mindfulness movement. 
We can draw some conclusions after having looked at the cultural conditions that led to, and 
the implications that followed from, these movements. In particular, one might say that these 
movements carried some residual colonial aspects. Also, some of the liberal modern ideological 
particulate, that surrounded and penetrated Buddhist Economics and the US mindfulness 
movement, helped to lead to a cultural flexibility that was counterproductive to these movements’ 
liberatory aims.  In other words, we will examine some examples of how Buddhist Economics and 
the US mindfulness movement were never fully decolonized and how the residual colonial aspects 
of these movements led to their inabilities to confront the colonial, liberal modern, capitalist 
cultural paradigm. In fact, I will argue that, in some ways, liberal modernity and capitalism have 
been strengthened. The failures of these movements did not merely result in the reproduction of 
the status quo; instead, capitalism, Seems to have been made more resilient by engaging with these 
movements. It should be noted that the cultural paradigm has, to some degree, shifted in some of 
the directions that were intended by the conceivers of these movements. However, these shifts have 
mostly occurred in ways that have been non-threatening to contemporary sources of power and 
non-threatening to cultural vehicles for power’s reproduction. 
Buddhist Economics should not be confused for any empirical study of economic forces in 
Buddhist Asia. Instead, Buddhist Economics is a system that has been proposed as an alternative 
to liberal modern economics. If it is not already clear, Buddhist Economics gets inspiration from 
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Buddhist doctrine. That said, much of Buddhist doctrine is not very relevant to the way that we 
tend to think of economic activity, so those non-economic aspects of Buddhist doctrine do not 
make their way into the proposed Buddhist Economics alternative system. However, some aspects 
of Buddhist thought do bear on what might constitute proper economic behavior, and Buddhist 
Economics finds its formulation following from some of these ideas. Buddhist Economics was 
developed by a European economist and it has since been elaborated by economists in Europe and 
the US, with some help from Buddhists in Asia. Buddhist Economics is described in a mix of liberal 
modern economics language and Buddhist language. 
Mindfulness is a movement that began as the proliferation of the kinds of rarefied meditation 
practices that were once obscure even in parts of Buddhist Asia. Thanks to a recent history of the 
democratization of Buddhist study and meditation2, lay meditation in Buddhist Asia has increased 
over the past several decades3. Then, through liberal modern scientific and medical institutions, a 
small group of people in the US intentionally gave legitimacy to meditation—that is, they helped 
to make legible, and normalize, meditation in liberal modern US culture. Mindfulness’s benefits 
have been widely touted by medical practitioners and Buddhist celebrities. Its popularity has grown 
so great that, in some cases, “mindfulness” has lost any direct association with meditation. In 
essence, the mindfulness in some cases of the US mindfulness movement no longer appears to be an 
aspect that retains any particular content. “Mindfulness” has become something like an empty 
linguistic container. 
What is interesting about the mindfulness movement is that some of its characteristics have 
managed to seep back into Asian Buddhisms. From before the contemporary US mindfulness 
                                                        
2 Braun, Erik. The Birth of Insight: Meditation, Modern Buddhism, and Burmese Monk Ledi Sayadaw. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2013. 
3 Wilson, Jeff. Mindful America. New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. 
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movement through the present day, the practice of Buddhist meditation in Asia has been made 
more popular than it had historically been. Still, as will be seen, the mindfulness movement appears 
to have had an impact on this change. Buddhist meditation—like all Buddhist practices—was 
traditionally always a clearly religious practice, intended to help effect other-worldly objectives. 
Today, Buddhist meditation is a practice that is widely thought of as a means for improving life on 
Earth. This change in the conception of Buddhist meditation can be seen in some Asian Buddhists 
as well as in US practitioners of mindfulness. 
The liberal modern concept of happiness was never before the aim of Buddhist meditation. I 
will later discuss a distinction between Buddhist concerns for contentment, as well as liberation 
from suffering, and liberal modern, individualistic, desire-driven happiness. Today, liberal modern 
concerns for happiness have meant that, instead of trying to put out the flame of one’s desire, US 
mindfulness meditation sometimes serves as a means for acquisition of commodities and for living 
a guilt-free, anxiety-free, liberal modern consumerist life.4 In Buddhist Economics, something 
similar, but different, appears. Buddhist Economics tells us that we can be happier if only we learn 
to be satisfied with less rather than to constantly seek elusive satisfaction through acquisition or 
achievement.5 
Buddhist Economics’s aims to confront liberal modern dissatisfaction by limiting desire. 
Increasing desires, and increasing consumption, relate to capitalist ecological devastation. By 
producing and consuming less of Earth’s resources, we could more easily preserve the planet. US 
mindfulness appears somewhat opposite to this temperament. Conceivers of the US mindfulness 
                                                        
4 Wilson, Mindful America. 
5 Not unlike Jacques Lacan’s conception of desire. See “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.” Écrits. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co. 2006. 75-81. 
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movement had no intentional constraint of production and consumption in mind, but by being 
more “mindful,” perhaps we might learn to be more thoughtful capitalists. 
The US mindfulness movement promises a guilt-free version of the kind of opulent lifestyle that 
those in privileged areas of the world can live. The educated, white, well-to-do people who tend to 
make up the US mindfulness movement can go about their days—not only without feeling as 
guilty, but—without the heavy emotional load of anxiety that keeps them from being productive 
workers and from being productive liberal modern citizens. 
Finally, I will argue that, because the US mindfulness movement attracts people who may be 
discontented by the contemporary cultural paradigm, mindfulness allows for the redirection of 
energies that might otherwise lead to social change6. Those who engage in mindfulness practices 
may identify as spiritually enlightened, thoughtful people, following a liberal modern capitalist 
Middle Way to a guilt-free, anxiety-free, productive, joyful consumerist Nirvana on Earth. 
In the end, these movements do a violence to the Buddhisms on which they base themselves, 
as well as to the Buddhisms of Asia that get transformed by liberal modern forces. Buddhist 
Economics and the US mindfulness movements were conceived in order to change the world for 
the better. Yet, it is hard to see any major material change that can clearly be attributed to either 
movement. Each movement has its efficacies, but it would be hard to argue that they are shifting 
us away from prevailing homogenizing cultural forces. This is true despite that a person living 
according to the commitments of these movements can live somewhat alternatively. There are 
cultural alterations that appear as products of these movements, but the adaptability of 
                                                        
6 Here, I am thinking of the argument put forward in Theodor Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s 
“The Culture Industry.” They propose that cultural products often have the effect of pacifying the 
masses and redirecting liberatory energies. 
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contemporary cultural forces is well-documented and appears to have more-or-less subsumed 
and/or contained the threats of these supposed attempts at subversion.
 Chapter One 
Always Already Modern: 
E. F. Schumacher and Buddhist Economics 
 
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be 
born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. — Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks1 
 
The 1970s carried the residue of previous decades’ utopic thinking. Aspirants searched in far-
flung places for answers and strategies with which to solve social problems and conceive of better 
socio-cultural paradigms. In some cases, they stripped away unuseful aspects of alternative social 
systems and combined them with bits of others. These utopic projects were critical of prevailing 
social forces, but this does not mean that they did not—at least in some ways—help to reproduce 
many of those social forces. While it seems fair to presume the sincerity of these efforts, these 
projects were complicated by the fact that the projects had to relate with prevailing socio-cultural 
forces. Buddhist Economics found itself in this situation. 
On one hand, E. F. Schumacher—the conceiver of Buddhist Economics2—was encouraged by 
the subversive potential in some aspects of Buddhist thought and Buddhist practice; on the other 
hand, he had to balance Buddhism’s usefulness with pragmatic concerns regarding how to make 
these ideas legible to a wide public. Schumacher saw the world as one in which right ideas and 
                                                        
1 Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International 
Publishers. 1992. 276. 
2 Schumacher, E. F. “Buddhist Economics.” Small is Beautiful. New York: Harper & Row. 1975. 
53-62. 
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useful strategies could ally to produce better outcomes. His work prioritized the efficient 
achievement of material results.3 
In Buddhist Economics, I argue, Schumacher formed a system that, while influential, fell short 
of effecting the changes that Schumacher’s work suggested. The importance of his work was great 
enough that a diverse array of writers from varying backgrounds have engaged with his ideas, but 
not so much that he made dramatic changes to liberal modernity.4 What emerges is a complicated 
relationship between prevailing social forces and attempts to improve social conditions. I argue 
that, on one hand, prevailing social forces help to determine what alternative social forces can and 
cannot be efficacious in people’s lives; on the other hand, without changing the most granular 
aspects of culture, it seems difficult to effect significant widespread change. This tension becomes 
clearer in discussions over coloniality and decoloniality. 
One obvious way to imagine the concept of coloniality is to think of the kind of logic that goes 
into settler colonialism.5 In settler colonialism, people enter a space and alter that space in ways 
that benefit themselves at the expense of some of what, and who, was already there. Coloniality 
and decoloniality operate through the construction of particular signs to help to determine a 
cultural whole. These operations function by changing culture at its atomic level in order to change 
the cultural conditions of possibility. Without specific, low-level changes, what we often see is 
surface-level aesthetic change and increased resiliency of prevailing socio-cultural forces. Another 
complication arises in how coloniality and decoloniality differently deal with difference. Coloniality 
presumes there to be one best option, regardless of the subjective position from which any 
                                                        
3 In an interview with the BBC, Schumacher pointed out the importance in putting ideas into 
practice. Mansfield, John. “The Other Way.” Horizon. London: BBC. 1974. 
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phenomenon is being analyzed. This best option always necessarily comes at the expense of any 
alternative. 
Already, though, we run into a problem. What is meant by “prevailing” and what is meant by 
“alternative?” Surely, these are not pure categories. No paradigm is likely ever stable and no 
paradigm is without impredictibilities.6 As such, to say that there is a “prevailing socio-cultural 
paradigm” or an “alternative” one is to oversimplify. This complicates my argument—or any 
argument over contemporary forms of coloniality and decoloniality—because what we do not want 
to suggest is that there is a set of actors and a set of forces that we could describe as purely “colonial” 
and that there is a set of actors and a set of forces that we could describe as purely “the colonized.” 
In some ways, such a clear binarization takes agency from everyone involved: if I am merely a 
colonialist doing what colonialists do, or if I am a colonized doing what colonized do, then I can 
only be a kind of mindless cog in a colonial machine. In such a pure case, there is no opportunity 
to influence outcomes. The truth is certainly more complicated than this, and I will address this 
complication throughout, albeit perhaps not completely sufficiently. That said, what is at stake is 
the nature of contemporary coloniality, especially in social movements. I intend to uncover a set 
of problems that are incurred when one engages in coloniality, even if a colonial act is well-
intended. Part of the problem lies in the nature of alterity itself. 
One might note the challenge in conceiving of  alterity from within a cultural paradigm, but 
this is just what makes alterity what it is. Without a default interior category, the other that is 
outside is not alternative at all. The mere act of conceiving of alterity is already a hegemonic act. 
This is not a minor point, and part of the decolonial response to coloniality is to critique coloniality 
on these grounds, as we will see through inspection of Buddhist Economics. Through Buddhist 
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Economics, Schumacher suggests that we reconsider cultural assumptions, but Buddhist 
Economics, despite its good intentions, fails by not going far enough. 
 
E. F. Schumacher and Buddhification: 
Liberal Modern Problems 
 
Science is a way of life. Science is a perspective. Science is the process that takes 
us from confusion to understanding in a manner that’s precise, predictive and 
reliable—a transformation, for those lucky enough to experience it, that is 
empowering and emotional. To be able to think through and grasp 
explanations—for everything from why the sky is blue to how life formed on 
earth—not because they are declared dogma but rather because they reveal 
patterns confirmed by experiment and observation, is one of the most precious of 
human experiences. — Brian Greene, “Put a Little Science in Your Life”7 
 
In 1911, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher was born in Bonn, Germany.8 He earned a Rhodes 
scholarship and attended the University of Oxford and Columbia University9 before permanently 
settling in England in order to escape the Nazi regime.10 However, the English government 
                                                        
7 Greene, Brian. “Put a Little Science in Your Life.” The New York Times. 
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9 Ibid. 
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interned Schumacher.11 While working on a farm during his internment, he wrote an economics 
paper titled, “Multilateral Clearing”12. This paper grabbed the attention of John Maynard Keynes, 
who managed to get Schumacher released.13  Schumacher helped to develop the UK’s welfare 
state, working under the government’s chief economic adviser14 before joining the British Coal 
Board.15 There, Schumacher argued for a conservationist approach to British coal use.16 He then 
visited Burma (now Myanmar), leading Schumacher to write “Buddhist Economics,” an essay 
through which he related views on technology, development, and justice.17 
“Buddhist Economics” appeared in Guy Wint’s Asia: A Handbook, leading to the publication of 
Schumacher’s own collection of essays, titled Small is Beautiful18. Schumacher’s book is largely a 
critique of political economy, focusing on issues to do with environmentalism, nuclear proliferation, 
development, and economic planning.19 He founds a number of radical theoretical arguments on 
empirical research done through his career, as well as what he sees as elements of Buddhism that 
hold promise for a new political economy.20 The Buddhist elements that he presents throughout 
Small is Beautiful help to explain why Schumacher refers to his vision as “Buddhist Economics.”  
Were it not for empirical work that Schumacher did to show the viability of alternative socio-
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economic modes, one might assume that he would have been pessimistic. Instead, Schumacher 
saw potential solutions in the face of developing disasters. 
Small is Beautiful was published in 1973. Schumacher’s book is a sprawling collection of critical 
essays on modern political economy and on viable socio-economic alternatives. Its ideas continue 
to influence social movements and contemporary literatures. In the book, he enters into 
conversation with Karl Marx, Mahatma Gandhi, John Maynard Keynes and others, sometimes in 
agreement and sometimes in opposition, but his primary mode is to present the world’s problems 
as a set of complex, opaque contradictions. The premises on which we operate, Schumacher 
asserts, are not conducive to the goals that we have nor to the goals that we should have. 
The book is composed of four parts: “The Modern World,” “Resources,” “The Third World,” 
and “Organisation and Ownership.” “The Modern World” describes the nature and causes of the 
world’s greatest economic problems. In “Resources,” Schumacher responds to these grave 
problems in such a way as to address the most essential and effectual aspects of the world’s 
problems, rather than merely providing temporary reliefs of symptoms. The problems in 
Schumacher’s “The Third World” are those related to what he calls “neocolonialism”—that is, 
how developed countries exploit and complicate conditions in countries with less geopolitical and 
economic power.21 “Organisation and Ownership” addresses problems in theories of scale and 
develops its own theoretical positions on scale. 
The arguments in Small is Beautiful depend on a few big ideas (even if they are now mostly well-
accepted): 1) people cause ecological devastation; 2) people live economically unequal lives; and 3) 
people in liberal modern societies are unfulfilled. These ideas are closely related. Increased 
ecological devastation increases economic inequality. Economic inequality—and the socio-
                                                        
21 Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 194. 
 25 
economic factors that cause economic inequality—contribute to people feeling unfulfilled. Finally, 
income inequality also contributes to greater ecological devastation. If we accept Schumacher’s 
arguments, then these features form a network by which each furthers the other, speeding us along 
a perilous path. 
One result of Schumacher’s book has been its contribution to various radical discourses. P. A. 
Payutto’s own Buddhist Economics22, and Laszlo Zsolnai’s “Western Economics Versus Buddhist 
Economics” help to clarify the Buddhist in “Buddhist Economics”—a Buddhist to which Schumacher 
gives scant attention.23 The character of our use of natural resources is an issue that is important 
in the works of Schumacher and Payutto, for instance. Payutto points out that, in Buddhist 
Economics, choices that benefit people are good choices, while choices that cause harm are to be 
avoided, so it is not always clear that production is necessary or useful.24 Some production is too 
clearly harmful to be considered worthy of pursuit in Buddhist Economics. 
In fact, Production is a misnomer, according to Payutto; things are not produced out of nothing. 
Instead, products come about by altering that which already exists. So, for Payutto, “Production is 
only truly justified when the value of the thing produced outweighs the value of that which is 
destroyed”25. Our uses of natural resources, then, might sometimes destroy something more 
valuable at the expense of producing something less valuable. Schumacher expresses similar 
concerns.  
Production also can lead to our suffering. Payutto says, “By their very nature, material things 
lack the ability to completely satisfy: they are impermanent and unstable, they cannot be ultimately 
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controlled and must inevitably go to dissolution. Clinging onto them, we suffer needlessly”26. Not 
only are material objects limited in their ability to satisfy us—when we become attached to 
whatever temporary satisfaction they might supply us, we inevitably create more suffering. “At its 
worst, consumption through taṇhā destroys its true objective, which is to enhance well-being”27. 
Buddhism defines two forms of desire. Taṇhā is short-term, reflexive craving, while chanda is long-
term, thoughtful intention.28 So taṇhā, the ephemeral form of desire, is responsible for increased 
suffering. Payutto explains, “[T]he more we have, the more we want. This is a result of the 
unchecked growth of taṇhā and the lack of any viable alternative. Meanwhile, the values of inner 
contentment and peace of mind seem to have been all but lost in modern society”29. What this 
suggests is that we always want to be consuming increasing amounts because we are unable to 
regulate ourselves and find lasting contentment. We always need more and we are never satisfied.30 
Because of this never-ending need to consume more, there is a serious ecological risk. The resources 
of the earth are limited. If things do not change, we will continue to increase fossil fuel use until the 
fossil fuels are gone.31 
In part, our dangerous behavior is determined by how we conceive of ourselves. Zsolnai says, 
“Thomas Schelling rightly characterises modern Western economics as an ‘egonomical framework’. 
Modern Western economics is centred on self-interest, understood as satisfaction of the wishes of 
one’s body-mind ego. Buddhism challenges this view because it has a different conception of the 
self, which is anatta, the ‘no-self’”32. If liberal economics conceives of economic activity as the 
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domain of the individual rather than of larger social bodies, then it makes sense that we might often 
fail to consider how our actions affect greater society, as well as how they affect nature.33 Buddhist 
Economics might produce something different. Buddhist doctrine tells us that all desire eventually 
leads to suffering34—a perspective quite different from that embodied in liberal economics. The 
fulfillment of desires is central to liberal modern economics. One of the reasons for the Buddhist 
understanding of the relationship between desire and suffering is that nature is always changing. If 
everything is always changing, then we cannot be permanently satisfied by anything, and nothing 
can permanently be satisfying.35 Satisfaction is always fleeting in part because of the different 
Buddhist idea of human nature. As Zsolnai says, Buddhism complicates the very idea of the self. 
Zsolnai says, “Anatta specifies the absence of a supposedly permanent and unchanging self in 
any one of the psychophysical constituents of empirical existence. What is normally thought of as 
the ‘self’ is an agglomeration of constantly changing physical and mental constituents, which give 
rise to unhappiness if clung to as though this temporary assemblage represented permanence”36. 
Here, Zsolnai explains the Buddhist position by which all of reality is always changing, including 
how we perceive the world. When he says the “psychophysical constituents of empirical existence,” 
we might think of this in a phenomenological way: both the subject and the object are always in 
states of transition. If what we perceive depends both on the thing that we perceive and the nature 
of our perception, then there seems to be no good reason to presume that our experience of the 
world should be a static thing. On this basis, it might be reasonable to argue for flexibility of 
thoughts and actions, but this flexibility depends on our being able to see more than our desires. 
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Schumacher refers to Gandhi’s thought: love is what allows us to overcome “greed, envy, lust, 
and hate”37. Instead of allowing selfish desires to rule over us, concern for one another can lead to 
better outcomes. Payutto Buddhistically formalizes this idea as a rule: “Economic activity must 
take place in such a way that it doesn’t harm oneself (by causing a decline in the quality of life) and 
does not harm others (by causing problems in society or imbalance in the environment)”38. There 
is no social bad that can arise if we do not harm ourselves or one another, but this requires 
forethought and a set of concerns that goes beyond the fulfillment of one’s ephemeral desires. 
According to Payutto , every “imbalance in the environment” is enough to cause problems. Even 
if a liberal modern might reject the importance of a balanced or harmonious natural world, it is at 
least reasonable to suggest that if we want to produce better outcomes, then we might need to live 
more intentionally. 
Through a Buddhist Economics hermeneutics, Schumacher and his followers have 
systematically identified a number of liberal modern problems worthy of redress. 
 
Hybrideology (Falsely): 
Modern Solutions in Buddhist Economics 
 
BLACKBOXING: An expression from the sociology of science that refers to the 
way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a 
machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on 
its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the 
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more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they 
become. — Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope39 
 
In 1973 (the same year that Small is Beautiful was published), a collection of essays, titled Toward 
a Steady-State Economy, introduced “Buddhist Economics” by pointing out that Schumacher’s 
starting point is different from that of liberal economics: “Beginning with Buddhist rather than 
Hobbesian assumptions about the nature of man [sic], E. F. Schumacher analyzes a pattern of 
economic behavior which is consistent with Buddhist values, and shows that it is remarkably 
consistent with ecological requirements in that it emphasizes the attainment of given ends with 
minimum means”40. Clearly, Schumacher was interested in viewing economics in new ways. 
However, an issue that emerges here is a difference between Buddhism and liberal modern 
economics. What is intended by “Buddhist Economics?” When the author says that Schumacher 
“analyzes a pattern of economic behavior,” it seems that the author might be describing a 
phenomenon that is observed in the world, but the evidence suggests that Schumacher’s is not an 
empirical study of economic practices. This is a problem that will later be analyzed in further detail. 
What can be said less controversially is that Schumacher’s thoughts form a system that is, in some 
ways, more intentional than the kind of thinking promoted under liberal economics. 
Part of what Schumacher wants to accomplish is to reconsider how we might engage with our 
ecological environment. The introduction continues, “The Buddhist belief in nonviolence, for 
example, enjoins Buddhists against ravaging the earth of its nonrenewable resources, and though 
Western countries are apt to look upon expenditure of human labor as something to be minimized, 
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in Buddhist economies human work is an aim to be achieved for itself”41. Buddhist belief in 
nonviolence is not necessarily so straightforward. At the very least, the assertion that it demands 
environmental consciousness does not seem to have a necessary relationship to Buddhist doctrine. 
The same could be said for this moralization of work. This is not so much a description of 
economies of Buddhist Asia. Schumacher’s conception of what economics should be was always 
an invention. 
Schumacher says that Buddhist Economics is “nonviolent” and that it is representative of 
detachment from “materialism”42. Of course, many Buddhists in Asia have, and have throughout 
history had, real concerns about their material lives.43 The relationship between happiness and 
material concerns seems complicated. Payutto weighs in, saying that, for people who equate 
happiness with simple “sense-pleasures” and “satisfaction of their desires,” “happiness remains a 
remote condition, something outside themselves, a future prize that must be pursued and captured. 
But happiness cannot be obtained through seeking, only through bringing about the causes and 
conditions which lead to it, and these are personal and mental development”44. Happiness requires 
an internal process, rather than intervention from something external. If happiness is what we seek, 
then the appropriate response is not to look outside, but to cultivate our best selves. What is 
necessary is progress toward versions of ourselves that automatically produce happiness. He 
continues, “Dependent happiness is happiness that requires an external object”45. Independent 
happiness “arises from within a mind that […] has attained some degree of inner peace” and “is 
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much more stable than dependent happiness”46. Perhaps inner peace produces the kind of 
happiness that is truly satisfying in the long-term, while fulfillment of desires through acquisitions 
can only lead to long-term dissatisfaction. In turn, long-term satisfaction helps to create inner 
peace, while short-term fulfillments of desires leave us unsatisfied. Payutto points out, “[S]triving 
for happiness, we create suffering; understanding suffering, we find peace”47. Because nothing 
permanently remains in any particular state, we are bound to encounter suffering so long as we 
seek ephemeral desires. Later, I will argue that this is consistent with a difference between liberal 
modern, short-term happiness and what I will distinguish as Buddhist long-term contentment. For 
now, we will focus on the Buddhist Economics conception of how to improve people’s lives on 
Earth. 
In Schumacher’s efforts to conceive of an improved society, he ties together social construction, 
individual behaviors, social and economic relations, interpersonal violence, and ecological 
devastation in a way that makes them appear inextricably linked. The problem, according to 
Schumacher, is that we are not always aware of these links—a point consistent with Buddhist 
thought on the illusory nature of reality. 
It is clear from Schumacher’s concerns with liberal economics that he sees problems in its basic 
assumptions—the ideas and traditions that allow liberal economics to influence our daily lives. It 
seems reasonable that he would think that education would be valuable for helping to fix problems. 
For Schumacher, education has great potential to do good or to do bad. He does not trust the 
taken-for-granted socio-cultural order and the mechanisms by which that socio-cultural order is 
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produced.48 Schumacher once said, “We can imagine only the things that we see every day in front 
of our eyes”49. 
Payutto sees this problem in the realm of economics as partly due to the narrow set of ideas 
that gets deployed through modern language.50 For Payutto, economics cannot be separated from 
ethics and from other human concerns, despite the liberal modern approach that is the default.51 
He says, “Focused as they are on the linear progression of the economic events that concern them, 
economists forget that nature unfolds in all directions”52. For Payutto, what is clear is that liberal 
economics presents a set of ideas and traditions through language that limits our view of economic 
phenomena. He suggests, “How is one to achieve the proper balance between moral and economic 
concerns? Education is also involved”53. The problem lies in a short-sightedness in liberal 
economics, whereas Buddhist thought can avoid some of liberal modernity’s mistakes. 
In education, Schumacher sees potential for a solution. He says, “More education can only 
help us if it produces more wisdom”54. This “wisdom” might appear in our ability to distinguish 
reality from falsity; education without this form of wisdom can lead to increased destruction.55 
Schumacher determines that, in addition to the destruction that already occurs, the prevailing 
education paradigm also causes tragedy in people’s daily lives. The privileging of science over 
metaphysics and ethics has led to increased sadness in humanity.56 Science cannot tell us how to 
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live (in other words, is does not determine ought).57 Therefore, “Our task—and the task of all 
education—is to understand the present world, the world in which we live and make our 
choices”58. It is important that we clarify what the world is around us. Then, we can realize what 
is best for us instead of making our choices blind to the influences that are exerted on us.  
Payutto echoes a similar point: “When ignorance is replaced with wisdom, it is possible to 
distinguish between what is of true benefit and what is not”59. If the reality of what is best for us 
remains unclear, then conditions are likely to worsen, but if we can act in the best interest of 
humanity as a whole, then we can create sustainable health and happiness.60 
Because we have not properly considered and acted on what would be best for us, Schumacher 
says, “we can say that the modern world has been shaped by technology”61. This presumes that 
there is a single, or at least dominant, source of phenomena in the world—a point to which we will 
return. The proper response to this would be a shift in our consciousness. 
When describing the supposed promised land of capitalist paradise, Schumacher writes, “The 
road to heaven is paved with bad intentions.”62 Perhaps what we are taught to strive for is 
constantly undermined by that which is supposedly required in that striving. If it is happiness, or 
contentment, that we seek, then, Schumacher might ask, why is it that what we do for the sake of 
achieving happiness seems to be the very cause of our suffering? Maybe heaven and hell exist not 
as ultimate outcomes at the end of our lives, but as something felt in the character of our quotidian 
lives. 
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The Buddha’s approach was sympathetic to concerns over the paths that determine our lives. 
He was clear in his assertion that what would be good for one person or people, in one situation, 
was not what would necessarily be good for everyone in every situation.63 As Payutto observes, the 
Buddha’s teachings (dharma) are prescriptive insofar as they instruct people how to best create 
harmony with a reality that is otherwise determined.64 The dharma represents an ethics that is based 
on nothing more or less than the path of least suffering for sentient beings. This is a very different 
sentiment from that which we see in liberal economics. 
The paradigm shift that Schumacher proposes is one of rethinking and one of foregoing 
mindless going-along. He argues for a radical departure from the systems of thought and action 
that have led us to where we are now. These changes would require that we inspect aspects of 
ourselves that we have not fully acknowledged. I am reminded of what Foucault said, to end his 
famous “What is Enlightenment?” essay: “[T]he critical task still entails faith in Enlightenment; I 
continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to 
our impatience for liberty”65. It seems to me that what Foucault is suggesting is that science, 
technology, and other forms of novel thought can be useful to us, but their applications have serious 
consequences in the world that are worth addressing with serious thought.  
Schumacher appears well-aware of the problems of liberal modernity run amok: “Success 
cannot be obtained by some form of magic produced by scientists, technicians, or economic 
planners. It can come only through a process of growth involving the education, organization, and 
discipline of the whole population. Anything less than this must end in failure”66. Both Foucault 
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and Schumacher seem to suggest that technical applications have to be constrained by non-liberal 
ways of thinking. It is not enough to simply produce scientific achievements. The applications of 
those innovations require deep consideration. At the very least, we can say that there appear 
tensions between some Buddhist ways of thought and some liberal modern ways of thought. 
 
Nonviolence and Violence in Buddhist Economics 
 
The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity “a 
place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable 
experiences.” — Edward Said, Orientalism67 
 
Buddhist Economics is nonviolent, Schumacher says, because it helps to ensure poor people’s 
survival, it reduces stress that would otherwise contribute to violence, it decreases competitiveness, 
and it lessens environmental devastation and natural disasters.68 Liberal modern economics, 
however, opposes the necessary conditions for peace, so liberal economics is Buddhist Economics’s 
violent counterpart. He justifies this in a few ways. 
Liberal modern economics assumes partly-ignorant, but rational, individuals fulfilling short-
term desires, rather than emotional people, capable of wisdom, considering long-term needs of 
society, including nature, in how they conceive of well-being. Here, what is meant by “wisdom” is 
defined by what comes after the term; in Buddhism, wisdom is embodied in those acts that create 
long-term harmony between bodies of various sorts.69 These behaviors contribute to one’s 
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happiness because they contribute to others’ well-being and to one’s own well-being in the same 
manner by which they contribute to others’ well-being. That is, what makes life better for one’s 
community is also likely to make life better for oneself and what improves one’s life also improves 
the community. In this sense, the individual creates something positive for themselves and for 
others. This act might also produce a sense of satisfaction in oneself and in the direction of the 
community. In order to optimize well-being, one must also consider their environment. 
Earth and everything on it naturally limits itself, but, according to Schumacher, technology has 
no self-limiting function.70 Here, Schumacher’s use of the term “technology” might as well be 
understood as “tools,” or combinations of human efficacy and non-human efficacy. Schumacher 
tells us that we ruin soil by treating agriculture like any industry that does not rely on preservation 
of its inputs.71 The same logic by which we use technology seems to dictate how we consume and 
produce in general, and this has consequences.72 Schumacher asserts that, because we cannot 
repair the earth, we have no right to ruin it.73 So long as we fail to consider these complications to 
our actions, nature appears to be at odds with predominant uses of technology.74 The problems 
with modern uses of resources appear apart from the use of soils, too. 
In “The Problem of Production,” Schumacher demonstrates that we are too quickly using too 
many natural resources. By a similar logic to that by which we treat soil, we generally treat natural 
resources as unlimited income instead of as capital that degrades over time, but fossil fuels are 
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limited.75 As Payutto says, “[A] Buddhist economics understands that non-consumption can 
contribute to well-being.” Schumacher repeatedly echoes this point. He tells us that liberal modern 
understandings of economics assume unlimited consumption, but the finitude of Earth’s resources 
imposes limitations on consumption.76 Schumacher alludes to the unsustainability of endless 
growth, warning that we must curtail our desires.77 
According to Schumacher, profit maximization is the purpose of liberal modern economic 
activity78. Profit maximization depends on the cultivation of desires.79 If we always want more, 
then we can never have enough and we can never be content; we will always be dissatisfied.80 
Fulfillment of ephemeral desires always eventually leads to disappointment, further desire, and so 
on. As Payutto puts it, when people pursue ephemeral sense-pleasures, “then life itself becomes a 
misery”81. Liberal economics legitimates the notion of “insatiable wants”82. Because we can never 
be satisfied, increased consumption is always encouraged and necessary. On the production side, 
the endless pursuit of profit leads to the demand for ever-increasing efficiency. Increasing scale is 
one way to improve efficiency, so we thoughtlessly fetishize scale.83 What follows from this is that 
increased consumption and increased production are always encouraged, leading to increasing 
rates of each. 
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Because consumption and production are fetishized84, all growth appears to be good, and the 
positive valuation of growth obfuscates and oversimplifies its full character.85 There are spiritual 
and humanistic implications: since, in liberal modern economics, all economic phenomena can be 
made equivalent to other economic phenomena, nothing is sacred.86 Schumacher disagrees with 
these equivalations because the value of growth is limited and because our ability to grow is limited. 
If we test those limits, it can have negative effects, so it is reasonable that we should, in some cases, 
consume less, despite what liberal modern economics might propose. 
Schumacher’s conception of Buddhist Economics is one with a clear relationship to liberal 
modern economics. Schumacher was, after all, an economist who worked for the British 
government. His project aims to discursively legitimate an alternative, but still liberal modern 
conception of economy. Buddhist Economics aims to increase marginal individual happiness and 
decrease marginal individual suffering by focusing on central tenets of Buddhist thought. Buddhist 
Economics does not necessarily reflect any Buddhist economic reality. 
Starting with Buddhist Economics’s genesis, its relationship to Buddhism has always been 
complicated. In describing his use of Buddhism to support his ideas for a new political economy, 
Schumacher says, “The choice of Buddhism for this purpose is purely incidental; the teachings of 
Christianity, Islam, or Judaism could have been used just as well as those of any other of the great 
Eastern traditions”87. Yet, Schumacher’s ideas for Buddhist Economics were informed by a trip to 
Burma.88 Schumacher was able to go on that trip thanks to forms of privilege that he capitalized 
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on. If it were not for his position in the British government at the time, he likely would not have 
been able to spend the time in Burma that he did. He then would not have been able to learn 
enough about Buddhism to be able to pull Buddhism apart and pick its most apparently appetizing 
constituent aspects. As has been shown (with some thanks to Payutto), Schumacher’s ideas resonate 
with some Buddhist ideals. It would be disingenuous to suppose that Buddhist Economics has no 
relationship to anything Buddhist. Schumacher is clear in that regard. We could hardly imagine 
that Payutto would pick up and elaborate finer points of Buddhist doctrine if Schumacher’s 
proposal were called, and bore a significant relationship to, “Pagan Economics” or “Muslim 
Economics,” for example. Instead, the Buddhist elements that Schumacher borrows (to be 
generous) allow Payutto to enter the conversation. It may be that other religious traditions could 
produce something similar to Buddhist Economics. However, given that they would be drawing 
on different concepts in different texts, they would likely produce at least somewhat different 
economic critiques. 
Schumacher draws on specific Buddhist principles in order to make his arguments, even if, as 
Zsolnai says, 
Buddhist Economics is not the same as Economics of Buddhism. The former is a 
modern discourse that utilizes elements of Buddhist thought to construct an 
alternative model of the economy and the latter is a study of how Buddhists organize 
their econimic [sic] life in real-world social settings, past or present. Buddhist 
Economics is essentially a normative enterprise while Economics of Buddhism is a 
descriptive endeavor.89 
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In other words, Buddhist Economics is an alternative conception of economics that is inspired by 
Buddhism, but has little to do with actually-experienced economic reality in Buddhist cultures. 
Buddhist Economics reads Buddhism in ways that further its liberal modern project, while 
disregarding many complications that Buddhism presents. It requires privilege to be able to 
combine liberal modern economics with Buddhist thought, and in the case of Buddhist Economics, 
there is a primacy of liberal modernity over Buddhism. That is, Schumacher’s project takes the 
useful aspects of Buddhism and fits them into his greater liberal modern ambitions—he is a 
scientist, looking after free individuals, concerned with this-worldly pleasures, and so on. By nesting 
Buddhist tools in a liberal modern conception of a better world, Schumacher’s project runs the risk 
of alienating some Buddhists and potentially painting them differently from how they prefer to be 
represented. This is, of course, not Schumacher’s aim, but the fact of the matter is here 
complicated. Schumacher’s project aims to produce a prescription for economic activity that can 
better-provide desirable outcomes, and we might agree that this is an admirable project to 
undertake, but it is also important that Buddhist Economics is a colonial project. 
 
Coloniality in Buddhist Economics 
 
Real as Nature, narrated as Discourse, collective as Society, existential as Being: 
such are the quasi-objects that the moderns have caused to proliferate. As such it 
behoves us to pursue them, while we simply become once more what we have 
never ceased to be: amoderns — Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern90 
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In Bruno Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern, he proposes that modernity is largely about the 
separation of the subject from the object, the mind from the body, the human from the natural.91 
Sisyphus’s arrogance led to his eternal efforts at an impossible task. The modernists seem to have 
occupied a worse position. At some point, Sisyphus must have found himself again returning to the 
bottom of Hades’s hill, again peering over his boulder and up a very steep slope. He then said 
something like, “This damn hellrock is never getting up this damn hellhill.” Apparently, the 
modernists are plenty happy pushing a rock of their own. 
This is all to point out that the separations that Latour talks about are ones that he says we 
would never be able to make. Instead, everything appears as a hybrid. In the modernist’s brightest 
attempts to rid the world of the problems that the modernist created, the modernist proposes more 
modernism. One can hardly blame the modernist, but that does not preclude criticism (perhaps 
even criticism of the modernist sort) of the efforts. 
I believe that E. F. Schumacher was an admirable person and I feel sympathy for his apparent 
hopes. Still, I think that he found himself at the bottom of a steep hill with a very big boulder to 
press against. Like so many moderns before him, Schumacher seems to have thought that if the 
moderns around him could only learn to see the world like he did, then there could yet be some 
hope. Schumacher presumes there to be clear modern answers to the problems created by 
moderns. For Schumacher, there are the wrong things that everyone else has been doing, and there 
is the right thing that everyone should be doing. It is simply that everyone is blind to the reality 
that he is privy to. Recall his concern for an education system that will allow people to see the 
world for what it is—presumably, an education system that propagates Schumacher’s ideals. 
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Buddhist Economics assumes a single, essential, correct, rational set of criteria to guide all 
economic activity on Earth. This conception of economics eventually finds its continued 
formalization in the form of a Buddhist microeconomics, in Zsolnai’s “Western Economics Versus 
Buddhist Economics,” and a Buddhist macroeconomics, first presented in Brown’s essay titled 
“Buddhist Economics: An Enlightened Approach to the Dismal Science”92, and further elaborated 
in her book by the same name.93 These specifications of Buddhist Economics might help to further 
the homogenizing, liberal modern project. 
Buddhist Economics is a program that relies on a colonialist logic. Setting aside for a moment 
the hybrid character of each of these categories, it is clear that British people and Burmese Buddhist 
people have been treated (by one another and by themselves) differently from one another, just as 
Buddhists and non-Buddhists and capitalists and non-capitalists have been treated differently from 
one another. How they are treated depends in part on ideas and traditions of any social body with 
which they come into contact. This happens in different kinds of cases, and at different levels of 
social interaction. This is partly because the assemblage of socio-cultural forces at play in any 
situation depend on a logic at any one level that must appear coherent on any level and between 
any levels.94 In the same way that settlers in the Americas unilaterally determined their role as 
bringing gifts in the form of progressive “ways of thinking and being”95, Schumacher’s economic 
system relies on a language and a tradition that normalizes the idea that he could form and present 
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a liberal modern Buddhist Economics as a system for disseminating progress both to the East and 
to the West. Modern teleology is partly responsible.96 Modernism is characterized by a tendency 
to assume that one right answer implies the temporal unfolding toward universal improvement. 
Buddhist cultures and liberal modernity manifest as different ontological and epistemological 
frames—each frame dependent on different ideas and different traditions. These different aspects 
of each culture help to differently determine people’s ways of thinking and being. 
Ultimately, the distance between Buddhism and liberal economics can be described as 
“ontological”—that is, this distance is marked by the difference between these two “ways of 
thinking and being”—as Arturo Escobar says.97 This ontology is determined previous to its effects. 
Escobar’s argument shares a close relationship with Walter Mignolo’s. Mignolo finds that power 
is sometimes asserted in ways that help to determine people’s ways of thinking and being.98 What 
Escobar and Mignolo describe is the process by which language acts as a constraint on people’s 
understandings of the world. All uses of language depend on their social constructions.99 For 
example, Buddhism is determined through signs that are passed from one person to another, just 
as liberal modern economics depends on signs that are learned through social interactions. As is 
clear, multiple language systems exist. A multitude of systems can present themselves within a space 
and each system is always malleable. If a British economist goes to meet a Buddhist monk in 
Burma, they may both refer to their communities, but what is community for a British economist 
may carry very different associations from what is imagined by the Buddhist monk. Herein lies a 
problem. When a particular sign is used, its full meaning is not completely clear to either the person 
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who deploys the sign or to their interlocutor. Not only can the interlocutor not be sure of everything 
that is intended by what is being said—neither is the speaker at once fully aware of their intent. In 
V. N. Vološinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, he says, “The domain of ideology coincides 
with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is 
present, too”100. There is no escaping at least some sense of culturally defined—and not always 
clearly understood and recognized—meaning in any instance of signification. 
This needs to be complicated some, however. While it may be that all of the atomic matter of 
our conscious thinking is given to us by others, there are opportunities for changing that atomic 
matter and for forming novel stories and unexpected behaviors. The process by which these 
interpretations can happen is sometimes referred to as “decoding”101. While symbols that are given 
to us already carry certain intentions, certain affects, and certain meanings, each of us has some 
freedom to differently interpret those symbols. In some sense, then, the decoding process also is 
one of encoding. We decode messages that are given to us and, as we make sense of those messages, 
we encode them in ways that allow us to make sense of them. The reason that this is important is 
that it is always both the case that our thoughts and social experiences are limited by social forces 
around us and that we are capable of producing unexpected and even novel interpretations of 
phenomena. Even if liberal moderns or Asian Buddhists are constrained by prevailing ideologies, 
they also can, and do, interpret the world in unpredictable ways. Unexpected understandings of 
the world sometimes lead to unpredicted responses. Without this fact, we would have to assume 
that Schumacher’s Buddhist Economics could never have come to fruition. Accounting for all its 
peculiarities, Schumacher’s Buddhist Economics certainly seems to have been a novel idea. 
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Those who engage with Buddhist Economics engage in a conversation that is necessarily 
complicated along multiple lines. By presenting an idea that relies both on aspects of Buddhism 
and aspects of liberal modernity, terms and concepts can easily become confused. Some Buddhist 
ideas are difficult to explain in liberal modern terms, and vice versa. For example, some liberal 
modern academic fields conceive of a fragmented, dissoluble reality that could seem incongruous 
with a Buddhist way of knowing the world.102 Liberal economics conceives of economic 
development and technology in ways that appear inconsistent with some Buddhist thought.103 Just 
as concepts like the autonomous individual, liberal modern progress, and the nation-state do not 
completely present themselves in clear, simple terms in traditional Buddhist literatures, karma, the 
Middle Way, and Nirvana are all ideas that are often misunderstood in the West.104 
Misunderstandings and reimaginings brought about by differing ontologies can result in the 
formation of what Homi Bhabha calls “hybridities” and “Third Spaces”105. Colonization is 
thought of as a process by which one group has power over another group, leading to impositions, 
but the power is never complete and never completely unilateral. The colonizer and would-be 
colonized meet in Third Spaces, where their interactions are mediated and negotiated, leading to 
different kinds of hybridities. When one meets the other, both sides are corrupted in some sense 
and new forms arise. This is important because, for all the intended unilaterality of Schumacher’s 
homogenizing, liberal modern project, it is also clear that Buddhism somehow changed 
Schumacher, that his project did change the minds of some Buddhists, and that Buddhist 
Economics is necessarily engaged in Third Spaces. These Third Spaces within which Buddhist 
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Economics comes into contact with new subjectivities are the sites at which Buddhist Economics is 
decoded and transformed. 
By now, it is clear that there is a tension. On one hand, liberal modernity is characterized by 
forces that impose and produce homogeneities, often resulting in violent consequences. On the 
other hand, it is just as homogenizing and imposing to suggest that liberal modernity simply results 
in the predictable domination of the helpless subaltern. It is important to recognize that liberal 
modernity is characterized by treatment of nature and people as instruments, but that these 
imposing liberal modern logics and behaviors are often met with resistances of various sorts. The 
consequences of coloniality are often violent, but they are maybe never completely predictable. 
Buddhist Economics is both the unpredictable product of a resistance to liberal modernity and it 
reproduces imposing, homogenizing forces that characterize liberal modernity. This can be seen, 
in part, through how particular signs are formed, misunderstood, and reproduced. 
Despite that Buddhism influences Buddhist Economics, it is too easy for confusions to lead to 
the bending of particular signs toward or away from either liberal economics or Buddhist thought. 
The meanings of signs slip between different conceptions, allowing for instances of domination of 
one paradigm over another. Schumacher’s scheme relies on a teleological view by which his system 
is to provide universal progress to a world of different senses of value. If one ontology sees progress 
as one thing and what Schumacher proposes is something else, then the progress that is to be made 
might not be progress at all. 
To give an example, Clair Brown has recently begun to write on Buddhist Economics.106 What 
we see in Brown’s writing, as in so many utopic literatures of the past, is a clarion call. It is a call 
to follow the trailblazer, the vanguard, the hero to a better, more enlightened, utopic future. It 
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assumes that there is one clear, true answer to the problems and that Brown (and/or others) has 
(have) discovered what is the answer to the problems. She, Schumacher, and others want that 
people—for people’s own benefit—know the truth that has been uncovered. 
When Schumacher defines Buddhist Economics, he does so in liberal modern language 
because that is the tradition that produces his ways of thinking and being. This helps to explain his 
tendency to essentialize and totalize. Earlier we noted this tendency when Schumacher said, “we 
can say that the modern world has been shaped by technology”107. There is a lack of nuance here. 
This statement proposes that technology is at the bottom of everything that happens in the modern 
world. Moreover, no modern person can hope to escape or change this. This is a problem. 
Another example of this kind of problem presents itself in Schumacher’s concern over what 
Marx calls “exchange-value”108—i.e. market prices by which some amount of anything can be 
exchanged with some amount of anything else—as particularly problematic.109 He sees the 
homogenization of different kinds of products and human experiences as dangerous. Schumacher 
determines that, under the modern capitalist paradigm, “money is the highest of all values”110. 
Again, in modernity, money is certainly valuable, but this kind of determination assumes people’s 
lack of agency. It assumes a single idea of how people are and how they can be within a system. 
Liberal modernity is always married to coloniality.111 In order for anything to be liberal 
modern, it always requires the totalizing, essentializing, homogenizing, rationalist coloniality that 
forms liberal modernity’s underside. These aspects form what is unique about European liberal 
modernity. Anything that is characteristically liberal modern is so because of its convergent logic. 
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What I mean is that liberal modernity always presumes there to be a “right,” “better,” 
“progressive,” etc. There is always a moralization by which a singular point is better than any other 
option and this singular point is always determined from within a liberal modern framework. 
Coloniality’s conception of difference presumes a rationalist, liberal modern epistemological frame 
that discursively defines some totalizing rubric for ethical behavior in that behavior’s appropriate 
sphere. Coloniality appears when the modernist/colonialist defines their liberal modern/colonial 
relationship to the other. They unilaterally, discursively define the ethical truth for themselves and 
for the other. 
Buddhist Economics was conceived of through Schumacher’s unilateral erasure of some 
aspects of Buddhism and his unilateral alteration of other aspects of Buddhism. These acts serve 
the totalizing prescriptive project of Buddhist Economics. All aspects of culture require choices that 
privilege some aspects over others, even in the choice to use some terms over others, for instance. 
Such cases place different emphasis or associate different feelings with any phenomenon than 
would have otherwise been the case. This “barbarism,” as Benjamin calls it, might appear subtle 
or innocuous, and certainly some cases seem more problematic than do others. Still, Buddhist 
Economics is not the economics of Buddhism, and there is some barbarism in the unilateral 
moralizing determination of Buddhist Economics.112 While it is worth noting that Payutto has 
joined the conversation to assist Buddhist Economics’s Buddhist legitimacy, it is also true that 
Payutto is clearly responding to liberal modern economic forces. Payutto, too, is engaging in a 
modern project, even if Payutto’s involvement might not be thought of as colonial in the same way 
that Schumacher’s more clearly is.  
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Schumacher variously refers to universalized ideals: the size of the city, the level of technology, 
the spirituality and religiosity of a society, degrees of specialization, the abolition of nuclear power, 
etc. His book chapters have titles like, “The Problem of Production,” “The Role of Economics,” 
“The Greatest Resource—Education,” “The Problem of Unemployment in India,” and “A 
Machine to Foretell the Future?” He consistently conceives of reality as made up of singular, 
convergent ideas, instead of ideas that open up to other possibilities. This convergent thinking 
implies a telos by which we are always moving toward some singular ideal of reality. That 
singularity can produce barbaric outcomes for any aspect of reality that does not fit neatly within 
the model appropriate to the ideal. 
Some of the problems with Buddhist Economics arise from some liberal modern 
misunderstandings of Buddhism in general. 
While it is true that there are Buddhist monks and nuns who live simple lives, who meditate, 
and who choose to forego eating meat, these do not constitute the reality for all Buddhists.113 In 
fact, there are Buddhist parts of the world in which meditation is not practiced by most 
Buddhists114, even if specialized Buddhist practices like meditation are more common in some 
schools of Buddhist practice than in other schools.115 On one hand, this is evidence that Buddhism 
has a long history of transformation and multiplicity; on the other hand, liberal modern ideas of 
Buddhism are often somewhat distorted.116 It is not uncommon for Buddhism to be practiced in 
conjunction with other religious and place-specific traditions such that some Buddhists’ religious 
practices are not clearly reflective of any Buddhist teachings.117 Buddhist teachings and Buddhist 
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culture emphasize non-liberal modern ideas of the self, of the connections between people and 
other phenomena, of wealth, and of a host of other problematics. It should not, however, be 
assumed that all devout Buddhists are Buddhist scholars, just as it should not be assumed that all 
Buddhists live ascetic lives or spend much, if any, time meditating or participating in elaborate 
Buddhist rituals.118 There are stark examples of such complications. For example, the supposed 
peacefulness of Buddhism is complicated by the Rohingya violence in Myanmar119 or the Sri 
Lankan Civil War120, but even violence sometimes becomes problematic in the daily lives of normal 
Buddhists.121 These confusions form the ground on which harms can be effected. 
When reality presents a need to define a term, it can appear as an opportunity for the victors 
to effect colonial “barbarism”122. Historical accounts demonstrate how the act of defining people, 
places, events, and other phenomena sometimes manifests power.123 In some cases, this kind of 
power sometimes appears in the privileges one group enjoys over another group. For Schumacher, 
this power lay in, and was reproduced through, his ability to go to Burma as a technocrat and to 
study Buddhism in his leisure time. He was then able to disseminate his ideas of a hybrid economic 
system meant to bring progress to the East and West. 
The privileging of one group over another—and of one way of thinking over another—is 
allowed according to a complex process that depends on a particular “ontology,” as Arturo Escobar 
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puts it.124 Such an ontology comes to being as “the effects of a ‘tradition’ in giving orientation to 
people’s […] ways of thinking and being”125. In other words, a tradition forms a starting point that 
helps to determine people’s thoughts and actions. These ontologies, or “ways of thinking and 
being,” depend partly on how traditions and ideas are defined.126 How people in powerful positions 
decide to define terms influences people’s behaviors, attitudes, and social interactions.127 If a person 
is defined as different from another person, then those people can be treated differently from one 
another, for example.128 In the liberal modern/colonial ontology, this difference is extreme: it is 
universally defined, it is right, and it is absolute, even when it prefigures violence. 
Schumacher conceived of Buddhist Economics by appropriating some Buddhist thoughts while 
leaving out others. While Buddhism has typically undergone significant transformations when 
entering into new areas of the world129, what Schumacher here does is something qualitatively 
different.130 Schumacher’s conception of Buddhist Economics is colonial in the sense that it 
presumes a single right perspective and a single modern set of correct answers to the problems that 
it raises. In Edward Said’s Orientalism, he says, 
There is very little consent to be found, for example, in the fact that Flaubert’s 
encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the 
Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, 
presence, or history. He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, 
comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that 
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allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and 
tell his reader in what way she was “typically Oriental.”131 
Like in Flaubert’s case, I do not presume that Schumacher intended any harm, but also like 
Flaubert, Schumacher does not seem to have gained anything that we might think of as proper 
consent for representing Buddhist thought and Buddhist practice and it may be that many 
Buddhists would have objections to aspects of his project, if not his project altogether. 
 
Buddhist Economics: 
Liberal Modern Utopic Mirage 
 
If a person is living out his Personal Legend, he knows everything he needs to 
know. There is only one thing that makes a dream impossible to achieve: the fear 
of failure. — Paul Coelho, The Alchemist132 
 
Bruno Latour declares that we have never been modern.133 Never have we been enlightened 
rational people, in touch with some outside reality as it is, coldly and beneficently making informed 
decisions to produce optimal outcomes. We believe ourselves to be bigger than we are, smarter 
than we are, more important than we are, more righteous than we are, and so on. Ironically, the 
rationalism that we hold in such high regard is the very thing that keeps us from recognizing that 
what modernity aims to achieve is a kind of Sisyphean task performed through formulas, 
microscopes, market exchanges, liberal state institutions, and so on. I think that Latour might be 
                                                        
131 Said, Orientalism, 6. 
132 Coelho, Paulo. The Alchemist. San Fransisco: HarperCollins. 2005. 147. 
133 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
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on to something. The hubris of liberal modernity is very near to its heart, but we liberal moderns 
are mostly all complicit in this.134 
I am sympathetic to what Schumacher seemed to have been aiming to do, and in many ways, 
I agree with him. There are a lot of problems with liberal modern economics, liberal modern 
technology, liberal modern desire, liberal modern inequality, and so on. I think that Schumacher 
is probably right when he concludes that the problem largely stems from how we think (and fail to 
think), and that education might provide a means for helping to fix some of the problems. 
Schumacher was exceptionally clear-headed and forward-thinking when it came to problematizing 
the liberal modern development paradigm, as well as the ecological devastation that we cause. 
Probably due in large part to the time in which Schumacher lived—when it was still very much 
in vogue to theorize in terms of finding the one right answer to solving the essential problem at the 
bottom of everything—the pragmatic hopes of his project mostly have failed to materialize. While 
he has had lasting influence in environmental movements and in reconceiving of development, it 
is surely the case that if Schumacher were alive today, he would not be pleased with the current 
state of affairs. In part, this is, I think, because the totalizing, essentializing nature of his analysis is 
one that fails to see the violence in that kind of analysis. Put another way, there is, I think, a tension 
between the kind of liberal modern utopic project that Schumacher attempts and the ways of 
thinking and being that are produced under Buddhisms. Today, it is more acceptable to conclude 
that the very terms that we use carry profound historical meanings that often carry microviolences 
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in them. Despite all Schumacher’s good intentions (and not to say that I think anything of where 
Schumacher be in any afterlife), his project was a colonial one. 
Schumacher’s totalizing, essentializing analysis produced a Buddhist Economics that was 
maybe Buddhistic in some ways, but was more liberal in its conception of economics. Schumacher 
demonstrated his technocratic privilege (amid other forms of privilege) by asserting that he knew 
what the problems were and how to fix them, and that it meant appropriating aspects of Buddhism 
while ignoring other aspects. In the end, Buddhist Economics was an interesting idea that rung 
with the utopic fervor of so many 1968 movements, but what we did not yet realize was that this 
utopia was really a colony, and to be clear, a colony is not really a utopia except maybe to the 
colonialist. Like so many of those 1968 movements, Buddhist Economics fits into an increasingly 
smaller space, withering away at the margins of yesteryear’s utopic thinking.
 Chapter Two 
The Is-ness of Mindfulness: 
A Brief History of the US Mindfulness Movement 
 
The hearts and minds of Westerners will grasp with pleasure the light of wisdom 
in the Abhidhamma. Furthermore, a great event will be recorded as momentous 
in the history of the sāsana, for the great Buddhasāsanas of West and East will mix 
into one entity some time soon, so as to cause in the future in Europe a cry of joy. 
— Wunnita, Lay‘ tī cha rā to ther‘ mrat‘ krī” e mahatheruppati kathā1 
 
In recent years, there has been lively discussion over how secularity and religiosity should be 
defined. It becomes increasingly clear that secularity is not simply a negative category, devoid of 
social or cultural material its own. This marks a change from some earlier notions of secularity. 
In G. W. F. Hegel’s “Faith and Knowledge,” he asserts that philosophy once served religion.2 
Religion explained the world to which Hegel refers (a necessarily white, European, male-
dominated one), but modern thinking helped us to understand the laws that God had put into 
place. Science and philosophy gained greater purchase as means for explaining the world, but, for 
a long time, science and philosophy still were nested in a primarily religious understanding of the 
world. According to this argument, religious contestations of the Reformation became important 
to the masses, leading to increasing importance of people’s religious faith. Without one’s faith in 
one argument over another, there would be no way to choose a side. We should set aside for the 
                                                        
1 Braun, Erik. The Birth of Insight: Meditation, Modern Buddhism, and Burmese Monk Ledi Sayadaw. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2013. 88. 
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moment that these arguments, the importance of these arguments, and people’s personal 
alignments were also socially determined in some ways and that they were often at least partly-
determined by the authorities (clergy, nobility, etc.) to which any individual was subject. 
At least ostensibly, religious faith became internalized and our decisions became more personal 
at the same time that science increasingly appeared to explain the world.3 Because of science, new 
capacities meant that the world could be radically transformed. We increasingly saw the world as 
equipment.4 This change coincided with an increased tendency to look to science as the sole source 
for understanding the world. Our lives were ruled by science’s laws and by internalized personal 
decisions, so we increasingly viewed ourselves and one another as responsible for the outcomes of 
our lives. As Charles Taylor puts it, moral authority came to be understood as coming from 
ourselves, and from understanding the world through science, rather than as coming from more 
socially-determined views of God as had previously been the case.5 Religion had once been the 
source for explaining the universe and the source from which we drew the assumptions on which 
we based our daily thoughts and actions. However, it increasingly came to be that we put our faith 
in science instead of religion. Religion was pushed to the margins of modern social experience and 
modern social thought. 
It seems perfectly coherent to reject the notion that the Reformation fully determined the 
internalization of people’s understanding of the world, of their religious sentiments, and of their 
sense of responsibility. Still, Hegel certainly seems to have alluded to some individualizing process 
                                                        
3 In Jean Baudrillard’s 1975 The Mirror of Production, he proposes that one of the major modern 
problems is that, through their value as labor power, people are reduced to mere aspects of nature 
that can be controlled and manipulated for profit. 
4 Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings. 
London: Routledge. 1993. 311-41. 
5 Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2007. 580. 
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that seems to persist today and to which we still respond through discursive analysis and 
theorization. 
One example of the reconception of these ideas appears in what Mark Juergensmeyer has 
called “ideologies of order”6. He says that ideologies of order: “conceive of the world around them 
as a coherent, manageable system.” Ideologies of order are systematic ways of imagining the world 
as following predictable patterns that can help us to know how to properly function. Juergensmeyer 
continues, saying that ideologies of order “suggest that there are levels of meaning beneath the day-
to-day world that explain things unseen.” Ideologies of order help us to think of the world through 
symbolic terms that help to motivate our behavior. Juergensmeyer further says that ideologies of 
order “provide the authority that gives social and political order a reason for being”7. Because we 
see the world as systematic and because ideologies of order give importance to our lives beyond 
simply surviving, institutions that rule over our lives can appear necessary and useful. He continues, 
“In doing so they define how an individual should properly act in the world, and they relate persons 
to the social whole”8. Ideologies of order give our lives meaning and give legitimacy to institutions, 
but they also help us to imagine our social roles in supporting what is important in the world. 
Charles Taylor describes the liberal modern ideology of order as what he calls the “immanent 
frame”—a way of understanding the world by which everything can eventually be understood 
through liberal modern sciences.9 Other-worldly concerns of religion necessarily lie apart from the 
liberal modern immanent frame and have no bearing on broader modern social life. That is, it is 
not liberal modern social life if it relates with other-worldly concerns. Liberal modern science gives 
                                                        
6 Juergensmeyer has used this term in various places. A good explanation of it appears in his “The 
New Religious State.” Comparative Politics 27 (4): 379-91. 
7 Juergensmeyer, Mark. “The New Religious State.” Comparative Politics 27 (4): 380-1. 
8 Ibid., 381. 
9 Taylor, Charles.  A Secular Age. 
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us liberal modern social explanations for the world, including liberal modern scientific explanations 
for the outcomes of people’s choices. This marks a change coincident with liberal modernity, but 
also with coloniality. In liberal modernity, basic terms, like “religion,” “science,” “technology,” 
“truth,” and countless others get redefined in order to better accommodate the will of those who 
hold power. 
Religion, especially in its other-worldly concerns, has become socially secondary to worldly 
preoccupations. One might try to explain religious understandings in liberal modern scientific 
ways. Sometimes, as will be seen, the opposite occurs. Some Buddhists—some of which we will 
discuss—have argued that science describes that to which Buddhist thought has always referred. 
In the cases that we inspect, though, there is an important difference between the nesting of liberal 
modern scientific understanding beneath the Buddhist cosmological understanding of the world 
and a conception of Buddhism that is necessarily subordinated to the secular liberal modern 
scientific understanding of the world. Taylor might respond by reiterating that belief is at the heart 
of religiosity and that Buddhism’s relationship to liberal modern science demonstrates a non-liberal 
religious frame. 
Talal Asad complicates Taylor’s thesis by pointing out that religion need not be closely 
associated with belief.10 Belief is not necessarily more important in legitimating religiosity than are 
embodied and communal practices of religion. Embodied and communal practices are important 
for tracing the relationship between Buddhism as an Asian religion—fairly isolated from Europe 
and the Americas—and contemporary Buddhist-inflected cultural movements. Taylor’s maneuver 
allows an ambivalence. On one hand, Taylor demonstrates a liberal modern understanding of 
religion that removes legitimate religiosity from embodied and communal practices; on the other 
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hand, historically religious embodied and communal practices are made available for 
appropriation (and for expropriation) in and through non-religious contexts. 
The other important point that Asad makes is that religion cannot be a stable category.11 This 
may go for any categorization, but Asad’s point is that all categorizations rely on a kind of 
retrospective meaning-making. We look backward, as the other, to some prior event. From the 
perspective of our now-temporally different subjectivity, we unilaterally determine some causation 
that informs the categorization. In the case of religion, we look back from the present to determine 
whether what happened was caused by individual belief, by a socially constructed sense of ritual, 
or by something else. The same is true when one says what is or is not Buddhist Economics or 
mindfulness or religious or secular or anything else. It is important to recognize that any attempt 
to reify these phenomena into clear, stable, fixed objects is doomed to some degree of failure. 
In this chapter, I will refer to what I call “the US mindfulness movement,” an increasingly 
popular social movement that is based on aspects of Buddhism. It adopts liberal modern 
conceptions of individuality, science, happiness, and material consumption.12 Because US 
mindfulness does not threaten liberal modern ideas, mindfulness folds neatly into the immanent 
frame. In some sense, it could be said that the US mindfulness movement appears as intentionally 
colonized aspects of Buddhism, indirectly leading to colonization of Asian Buddhisms, themselves. 
US mindfulness, like recycling or rounding up at the cash register for a charitable cause, offers the 
promise of unlimited socially conscious consumption13, despite that many of mindfulness’s most 
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enthusiastic proponents think of mindfulness as a means for dramatic social change.14 If one were 
to claim that US mindfulness is a Buddhism like its forebears, one would have to reconcile such a 
conception of mindfulness with the fact that Buddhisms subordinate scientific questions to a 
Buddhist understanding of the world, that Buddhisms haves historically advocated for 
disconnection from worldly pleasures, and that Buddhisms have always held the position that 
Buddhist actions should avoid causing harm. 
To quickly describe what mindfulness is, Buddhist doctrine refers to a beneficial mental state. 
One translation of the term used to describe this mental state (sati) is “mindfulness.” Around the 
beginning of the 20th century, a Burmese Buddhist monk named Ledi Sayadaw, encouraged 
Buddhist study and Buddhist meditation among lay people in a way that had before never been 
done. As meditation and mindfulness became popularized, travelers to Burma (now Myanmar) 
also learned of meditation and mindfulness. Perhaps owed to the most popular definition of sati, 
the concept of the earlier-mentioned important Buddhist mental state has been reduced to a more 
Anglicized understanding of the English word “mindfulness.” In the US, mindfulness that comes 
from Buddhist meditation is merely something like a kind of awareness and lucidity. 
The US mindfulness movement was intentionally conceived of as a means of transforming 
liberal modern culture by  improving the lives of people in the US and altering their ways of seeing 
the world. Initially, mindfulness practice was more-or-less synonymous with any Buddhist-
informed meditation, but that would change. The US mindfulness movement entailed the stripping 
away of many aspects of Buddhism, mixing schools of Buddhist thought, and capitalizing (in the 
economic sense) on mindfulness’s appeal. Eventually, US mindfulness would transform in 
unexpected—in some cases, counterintuitive—and sometimes problematic ways. 
                                                        
14 Wilson. Mindful America. 
 61 
The US mindfulness movement appropriates elements of Buddhism.15 This movement appeals 
to a broad array of discontented US people. Mindfulness relies on the use of, decontextualization 
of, and profit by Buddhist elements and by elements imagined as Buddhistic.16 This process 
privileges Buddhist elements that are compatible with individualist and consumerist motivations at 
the expense of aspects of Buddhism that challenge liberal modern conceptions of the individual 
and of material consumption.17 In no small part, this transformation has been made possible by 
the legitimation of US mindfulness in and through scientific and medical institutions.18 In other 
words, some of Buddhism’s most basic foundations have been redefined in order to assimilate 
aspects of Buddhism into liberal modernity. In the late 20th century, neuroscientific studies were 
undertaken in order to support some Buddhist teachers’ intentional recontextualization of 
mindfulness in the US.  This helped to lead to broadening acceptance of mindfulness practices. 
While these conceivers of the US mindfulness movement aspired to cultivate a movement by which 
a more thoughtful and spiritual Western populace would make more-enlightened decisions, the 
products of US mindfulness have done little, if anything, to challenge the prevailing liberal modern 
paradigm. It may be that a regime that included Buddhist thoughts and practices could provide an 
important anti-liberal modern strategy, there appears to be no clear evidence that the US 
mindfulness movement represents such a case. One important complication presents itself, for 
instance, in the fact that US mindfulness has been commodified and its complementary 
commodities have been marketed in ways that support prevailing liberal modern social forces. 
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In the end, the US mindfulness movement does not challenge the atomic foundations of 
modernity sufficiently to cause radical social change.19 Instead, by assuaging some of the 
discomforts of those who are concerned over liberal modernity’s outcomes, US mindfulness helps 
to make liberal modernity more resilient. The US mindfulness movement helps to provide some 
of what is missing in the lives of liberal moderns and helps to make it so that some of the most 
concerned people are put at ease. This helps to undermine the subversive zeal that would be 
necessary to make significant social change.20 
 
Mindful Roots: 
Ledi Sayadaw’s Response to Settler Colonialism 
 
The construction of the colonial difference goes hand in hand with the establishment 
of exteriority: exteriority is the place in which the outside (e.g., anthropos) is invented 
in the process of creating the inside (e.g., humanitas) to secure the safe space where 
the enunciator dwells. — Walter Mignolo, “Coloniality: The Darker Side of 
Modernity”21 
 
                                                        
19 Here, I am depending on an old, but oft-reformulated idea. Leibniz’s monad (see his Monadology), 
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20 Adorno, Theodor, and Horkheimer, Max. “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception.” Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2002. 94-136. 
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Before tracing out the full effects of mindfulness, it is instructive to consider modern 
mindfulness’s origins. In fact, “mindfulness” as a Buddhist concept is one that has proven difficult 
to translate into English, leading to the term’s simplification and misuse.22 Still, “mindfulness” 
might be the closest possible referent to the Buddhist concept it approximates. “Today 
‘mindfulness’ is well established as the preferred translation of ‘sati,’ as a survey of translations from 
the past half century will readily demonstrate. Sati literally means memory or remembrance. In its 
usage as a technical Buddhist meditation term, it usually implies awareness, attention, or 
alertness”23. So, use of the term “mindfulness” has legitimate Buddhist roots, but its meaning has 
transformed. Sati does not merely mean “mindfulness” in a colloquial English way. It is important 
to note, though, that Buddhism and its constituent aspects have a long history of transformation—
in some instances, those changes have been radical.24 The tale of mindfulness represents an 
extreme case of radical Buddhist transformation. 
Erik Braun’s The Birth of Insight describes how the British colonization of Burma, along with 
other factors, helped to establish the conditions necessary to the foundation of the US mindfulness 
movement.25 The US mindfulness movement shares a link to what was an emerging Burmese 
commitment to meditation.26 Previous to this, meditation in Burma was a practice that was siloed 
in Buddhist monasteries.27 Facing threats spurred by the British colonization of Burma, Ledi 
Sayadaw, a Burmese monk, saw meditation as the kind of embodied practice that could help to 
form a durable national identity. 
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It was partly because of Ledi’s dedication to a particular relationship between Buddhism and 
modernity that meditation became accessible to so many. As Braun puts it, “The creation of the 
potential for mass meditation depended on Ledi’s efforts”28. Ledi’s choice partly had to do with 
the transcendent concern for the afterlife. If Buddhist understandings of reality (dharma) were lost 
to the effects of colonization, that would throw people’s future lives into doubt. Without proper 
understanding, people would be more likely to produce negative karmic outcomes29 and would be 
more likely to have worse future lives. 
An unintended consequence of Ledi’s focus on meditation is that—in part because of 
colonization and, later, global consumer capitalism—meditation became a means to whatever ends 
anyone desired. Braun says that the absence of the “karmic threat” of spending hundreds of 
thousands of years in hell meant that “the reasons to practice change radically, and pragmatic goals 
come to the fore”30. In other words, the new emphasis on meditation allowed for a shift. Instead 
of meditation always (even if not primarily) serving other-worldly ends, meditation could in some 
cases be a tool for nothing more than accumulating material wealth or for experiencing pleasure. 
Instead of being a shared communal set of beliefs and practices that people engaged with in order 
to decrease their suffering and the sufferings of others, meditation eventually was in some cases 
internalized and deployed for the achievement only of individualistic ends. We will return to this 
point. 
Another innovation was that of meditationless mindfulness. The absence of Buddhist content 
from some iterations of the US mindfulness movement leaves it no relationship to any Buddhism. 
However, Braun notes: “Ledi […] also assures people in the Manual on the Factors of Awakening that 
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one can cultivate wisdom even without cultivating calm and concentration, though ideally one 
would follow the order of the seven purifications”31. A major difference is that Ledi was arguing 
within a Buddhist context, for the sake of trying to preserve Buddhism. No matter what 
transformation Ledi made, he was still perpetuating Buddhism. 
It is important to privilege the point that all Buddhist practices are, and always have been, 
ultimately owed to the primary motivation of producing other-worldly outcomes. While Buddhists 
do observe this-worldly benefits, meditation’s ultimate raison d’être always has been to decrease 
suffering in the universe.32 The achievement of decreased suffering appears differently in different 
schools of Buddhist thought, but this other-worldly goal is always present. In David McMahan’s 
The Making of Buddhist Modernism, he points out, “The Buddha, as is often repeated, said he taught 
only two things: suffering and the end of suffering”33. This notion of meditation’s role in Buddhism 
makes sense because meditation could allow a practitioner to better understand the world, to better 
understand Buddhist teachings, to better produce wisdom, and to help to change the world so that 
people (including the meditator, themselves) would suffer less than they otherwise would. Part of 
this process would necessarily mean that the practitioner would be more likely to move to a higher 
station in their next life and, at some point, possibly achieve enlightenment. 
By encouraging Burmese investment in meditation, Sayadaw hoped to fend off the potential 
loss of Buddhism altogether and to preserve some of the Burmese way of life. While Ledi hoped to 
preserve, his methods included the alteration of Burmese thought and practice. It is important to 
recognize that the new emphasis on meditation was not a departure from Buddhist tradition, but 
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a reconception of what was already there. Ledi Sayadaw applied his understanding of particular 
Buddhist texts—in this case, the Abhidharma—in new ways. Braun says, 
Meditation was not […] a means to reconcile or accommodate Buddhist values to 
modern values. Rather, Ledi’s Abhidhammic vision of meditation forced, along 
with moral action and study in groups, an enframing vision of modernity in 
Buddhist terms. This was a vision that was fundamentally different from Western 
modernity in a way that reveals the distinct character of a Burmese Buddhist 
modernity among multiple versions.34 
Instead of pushing religion aside in order to accommodate modern understandings, Ledi saw 
modernity as capable of fitting itself into Buddhist understandings. The framework for seeing the 
world was a Buddhist one, with liberal modern understandings possibly helping to fill in details, 
whereas in liberal modernity, religion was something personal that was often put to use for the sake 
of answering questions that did not find their answers in liberal modern institutions. This 
contrasted—not only with contemporaneous articulations of US modernism, but—with previously 
existing Buddhist understandings in Burma and elsewhere in Asia. 
Ledi’s particular background and interests made it so that he was able to produce a Buddhist 
tradition that could stand against British colonialism, even if that would later lead to unintended 
consequences. McMahan says, “Various Asian civilizations that have been colonized by European 
powers” have taken on liberal modern ideas of the self, autonomy, protest, and utopia, ironically, 
to form modern Buddhisms.35 Just as arguments during the Enlightenment might have helped to 
produce increasing secularity, Ledi’s efforts to preserve Buddhism eventually led to de-
Buddhification of some Buddhist practices in Asia and elsewhere. Part of this resulted from the 
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complicated history between Buddhism and science that could be traced back at least as far as 
Ledi. His cosmological understanding of the world did not prevent him from granting some 
legitimacy to liberal modern science. 
Ledi was not purely opposed to liberal modern science, but he did not seem to find it overly 
impressive. As far as Ledi was concerned, and partly reflective of Hegel’s thought (of science’s role 
having been in support of religious cosmovisions), Buddhism and Buddhist cultures sufficiently 
explained the world. Braun says, “Just like his mentor [Hpo Hlaing], Ledi understood Buddhism 
not as coequal to science but as served by it”36. In Ledi’s view, there was nothing necessarily wrong 
with liberal modern science, but liberal modern science demonstrated the specification of a more 
explanatory Buddhist cosmovision. In an article for Journal of the Burma Research Society, one of Ledi’s 
disciples, Shwe Zan Aung, put it another way: “Buddhism as a philosophy underlies all sciences”37. 
Returning to Juergensmeyer’s idea of ideologies of order, the tension between the British 
colonialist order and the Buddhist one comes to light in the following passage from Braun: 
As much as Ledi stressed reasoned refutations of Christian claims and celebrated 
Buddhism’s logicality, his arguments did not, in his view, represent a modernization 
of Buddhist teaching that necessitated a break with traditional beliefs and practices. 
While Ledi used his understanding of karma to criticize Christianity and other 
religions based on a strictly causal vision of the world, he did not have the modernist 
sensibility that dismissed all supernatural elements from the world or that 
discounted all apparently ‘magical’ apotropaic practices.38 
                                                        
36 Ibid., 83. 
37 Ibid., 204. 
38 Braun, The Birth of Insight, 82. 
 68 
Ledi is not simply liberal modern because he does not adopt the immanent frame or any other 
imposed transformation of Buddhism or of Burmese culture. He is not anti-liberal modern, though, 
either, because he does see value in science and in reason. He is probably not anti-anti-liberal 
modern, either—he could certainly sympathize with anti-liberal modernists. Instead, Ledi appears 
to be anti-anti-anti-liberal modern: he does not believe in the liberal modernity that is presented 
to him, he does not simply oppose all of liberal modernity out of hand, he is not opposed to such 
an opposition, but he would, instead, likely side with anti-liberal modernists while taking a more 
nuanced and complicated position than simple anti-liberal modernism. The reason to make this 
point, really, is to help to illuminate how complicated the situation was for Ledi, as he struggled 
over pre-existing commitments and how to strategize a world that was rapidly and dramatically 
changing around him. Perhaps Ledi’s ambitions were ones that could not be achieved without 
having to make sacrifices. Ledi’s imagining of liberal modern science as nested within the Buddhist 
ideology of order became susceptible to reversal, especially as mindfulness was increasingly married 
to individualized psychological understandings of human experience. 
The Insight Meditation Society is an organization that began in Burma, and for which Mahasi 
Sayadaw has been an important figure.39 This organization has spread through much of the world. 
Of them, Braun says, “There is a particular emphasis on the practice of mindfulness (sati), 
understood as a nonjudgmental state of choiceless, present-moment awareness, that has its roots in 
the Mahasi-inflected lineage of IMS teaching” 40. Instead of meditation being an integral part of a 
Buddhist tradition that emphasized all sentient beings’ liberation from suffering, IMS taught 
meditation as being about a particular psychological state. This shift was indicative of a broader 
trend. Mindfulness became a stand-alone practice, disseminated by lay people, and divorced from 
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many of its Buddhist ambitions. Braun continues, “As noted in the prior chapter, mindfulness in 
the orthodox Theravada conception is not conceptualized as merely neutral observation; it 
includes a governing awareness of Buddhist truths about the nature of the world”41. The term sati 
has historically represented much more than a calm, aware psychological state, but that term—for 
which “mindfulness” has become the English-language equivalent—has been reduced to merely 
this psychological state. 
The resistance to the immanent frame eventually changed, as McMahan says, 
[S]cientific interpretation of Buddhism was a crucial part of a number of indigenous 
modernization movements that attempted to excise ‘superstitious’ elements and 
adopt the language of scientific naturalism to describe their tradition to the West as 
well as their own nations. Interpreting Buddhism as aligned with modern science 
was quite successfully adaptive: today, as well as a century ago, Buddhism is widely 
considered to be largely compatible with the scientific worldview.42 
No longer was it that science had to be explained within, and through, a Buddhist frame; instead, 
science became the primary arbiter of truth. It is hard to imagine a better example of the formation 
of the immanent frame—anything that appears extraneous to liberal modern understandings 
becomes subject to possible disposal. While such an alteration surely helped Buddhism to 
proliferate in liberal modern society, a good deal of Buddhism seems to have been lost from the 
wider conception of Buddhism. Buddhism, and the meaning of “Buddhism,” have been changed 
partly by liberal modernity and coloniality. 
Ledi surely helped to transform Buddhist practice, but his transformations were not such that 
they removed much of what gave Buddhism its character. It was through the entrance of Buddhism 
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into what Homi Bhabha calls a Third Space that these changes were taken further and that some 
Buddhist practices were liberalized. Until the point that people in the US and Europe took hold of 
Buddhist thought and practice, there was no liberal modern form of Buddhist-inspired practice, 
but that eventually changed. 
 
Science and Psychology in Mindfulness 
 
Empathy with the past serves not least to make the past seem present. It is no 
coincidence that this tendency accords very well with a positivist conception of 
history (as seen in Eduard Meyer). In the field of history, the projection of the past 
into the present is analogous to the substitution of homogeneous configurations for 
changes in the physical world [Korperwelt]. The latter process has been identified 
by Meyerson as the basis of the natural sciences (De l'explication dans les sciences). The 
former is the quintessence of the ‘scientific’ character of history, as defined by 
positivism. It is secured at the cost of completely eradicating every vestige of 
history's original role as remembrance [Eingedenken]. The false aliveness of the 
past-made-present, the elimination of every echo of a ‘lament’ from history, marks 
history's final subjection to the modern concept of science. — Walter Benjamin, 
“Paralipomena to On the Concept of History”43 
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“Religion” is a term that comes—not from  people who practice, but—people who study 
human behavior.44 Like any category, its limits are ill-defined, however this category has a history 
that seems to belong to Europe and to what we might think of as proto-Europe in the form of the 
Roman Empire. The earliest usages of “religion” in relation to anything Christian come from fifth-
century descriptions of the cultic (the contemporaneous sense of “religious”) obsession of monastic 
Christian life. “Religion” has always been a category of some other. 
In a sense, this understanding of religion is helpful as we think about modern religiosity. The 
word “religion” was only ever a marked category because, before the immanent frame, there was 
no distinction between religious understanding and scientific understanding in the daily lives of 
most people. There was a way that the world was, there were social beliefs, and there were social 
rituals. Europeans, before the Enlightenment, lived in an enchanted, religious world. Their religio-
scientific truth lay partly in the interstice between shared thing-in-the-world reality and 
retrospective, discursive questions on causation and explanation. Liberal modernity, in some sense, 
is little more than the widening of that gap—dismantling any peaceful harmony between the mind 
and the body, the subject and the object, the human and nature, and so on.  
The question of truth, of course, is an old, complicated one. Juergensmeyer’s “ideologies of 
order” speak to the truths through which we live our lives. The kind of reflective cognition by 
which the truth of the world comes into question is one especially relevant to the dogmas of 
religions and of sciences. Donald Lopez, in Buddhism and Science, says that science and religion refer 
to different truths: conventional and ultimate, respectively.45 Science seeks to discover Earth’s laws, 
but religion aims for something greater. Stephen Jay Gould says, “The lack of conflict between 
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science and religion arises from a lack of overlap between their respective domains of professional 
expertise—science in the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for 
proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives”46. Regardless of how to properly 
delineate the two, what seems clear is that Buddhism is not a liberal modern science. Buddhism’s 
goals are not scientific and its main concerns lie apart from merely the quotidian or the earthly. 
Buddhism is not simply a means for enjoying life on Earth. Further, they are founded on different 
cosmologies—a point that, as Gould points out, is more important to religion than to science. So, 
there are clear problems when Buddhist teachers and practitioners claim Buddhism to have too 
close relationship to liberal modern science. 
The making of US mindfulness required rethinkings of Buddhism. In Heartwood, Jack Kornfield 
says, “We left much of the Eastern culture, ritual, and ceremony behind also in Asia… we felt that 
for Americans it was an unnecessary barrier. It seemed to us that for our culture the simplicity and 
straightforwardness of mindful practice itself would speak best to the heart of those seeking 
practice”47. According to Kornfield, “Eastern culture, ritual, and ceremony” lack some useful 
“simplicity and straightforwardness.” These aspects of Buddhism were “religious” in the fifth-
century sense.  These aspects of Buddhism lacked secular qualities that Kornfield supposed were 
valorized by US culture, so it would have been more challenging to have spread “mindful practice” 
while keeping all Eastern aspects intact. Kornfield’s argument is that there was something valuable 
to take from Buddhism but that the most efficient way to do that necessitated the effacement of 
much of Buddhism’s “religious” quality. 
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Jon Kabat-Zinn, a neuroscientist, sought to further the modernizing project by 
institutionalizing mindfulness.48 In his book, Contemporary Buddhism, he describes his means for 
deploying mindfulness: 
The intention and approach behind MBSR [Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction] 
were never meant to exploit, fragment, or decontextualize the dharma, but rather 
to recontextualize it within the frameworks of science, medicine (including psychiatry 
and psychology), and healthcare so that it would be maximally useful to people who 
could not hear it or enter into it through the more traditional dharma gates.49 
This reframing of aspects of Buddhism was, in Kabat-Zinn’s mind, for a good purpose. Instead of 
Buddhism’s usefulness being of other-worldly character, Buddhism could take people to the earthly 
promised land of reduced stress and pain. While there may be other potential benefits, these are 
what Kabat-Zinn focuses on, and he certainly was not going to tout his methods as a means for 
achieving Nirvana. 
We should note that there seems to be a clear difference between, on one hand, Ledi’s other-
worldly and anticolonial concerns for preserving the dharma and, on the other, the transformations 
that the US mindfulness movement produces. In the former case, one reason for the transformation 
is to ensure Buddhism’s survival, even if that means peripheral alterations to understandings of 
Buddhist doctrine. Through a homogenizing liberal modernist process, the US mindfulness 
movement more fully transforms Buddhist thought and practice. The point is not to conserve 
Buddhism as such; mindfulness, through aspects of Buddhism, supports liberal modern 
commitments. McMahan notes, “It is often said as a matter of course that liberal modernist forms 
of Buddhism have been westernized, demythologized, rationalized, Romanticized, Protestantized, 
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or psychologized”50. As the immanent frame suggests, religions now tend to be articulated with 
and through liberal modern language and liberal modern culture. It might seem impossible that 
liberal modern science would ever serve religion; rather, religion appears to necessarily serve 
modern science if religion performs any valuable function at all. 
Liberal modern religion is personal, but it is also subject to the public sphere—free to be 
analyzed, picked apart, argued over. One chooses the iteration of religion (or not-religion) that 
works best for oneself. Wilson says, 
As with other religious liberals, mindfulness movement authors champion adapting 
religion to suit changed cultural and historical circumstances, take nonliteral 
interpretations of scriptures and traditional elements of religion, allow for multiple 
valid viewpoints in religious matters, insist on the primacy of individual experience 
and conscience, assert the harmony of religion and science (and accept the findings 
of the latter as a primary source of knowledge), and take a positive view of basic 
human nature.51 
Increasingly, it seems that religion plays a secondary role to science when it comes to how we 
conceive of reality around us. It is no longer that religion tells us what the world is and that science 
tells us how, but the other way around. Religion might help to explain why it is that science works 
as it does, as though the Creator of the world formed scientific laws that the Creator is now 
beholden to. This follows a long line of liberal modern religious movements that modernize 
religion: such movements individualize belief, reinterpret doctrine, facilitate an environment of 
contestation, and scientize religion. The US mindfulness case is interesting, though. 
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In some sense, Kabat-Zinn wants to have his cake and eat it, too. On one hand, he simply 
assumes the validity of Buddhist dogma; on the other hand, he erases so much of the dogma in 
order to transform Buddhist practices into something that was surely not intended by Buddhist 
teachers and practitioners. In the end, Kabat-Zinn proclaims, “It is not really religious, since truth 
transcends religion”52. Of course, the claim that Budhhist dharma is truth is one that requires some 
kind of religious faith. The “truth” to which Kabat-Zinn refers is one that is, in some ways, different 
from the Buddha’s truth, but it is not necessarily different from liberal modern scientific truths. 
As mindfulness finds greater and greater legitimacy through scientization and medicalization—
and as mindfulness obfuscates Buddhism’s historical commitments—modernized Buddhism earns 
increasing respect from moderns. Buddhism is sometimes regarded as non-religious and scientific, 
despite its religiosity and its non-scientificness.53 Wilson says, “Rather than possible framings of 
Buddhists as backwards, foreign, irrational, or idol-worshipping, MBSR and related neuroscientific 
research on mindfulness allows Buddhists to present themselves as being cutting-edge, 
compassionate, scientific, and useful”54. If we take seriously the notion that liberal modernity 
increasingly sees itself as secular, it would be easy to presume that religious ritual might be viewed 
as immodern; in the case of Buddhism, meditation has become so tied up with liberal modern 
science and medicine that, instead of being thought of as backward, Buddhism is viewed as 
innovative and experimental—the epitome of the liberal modern scientific spirit. 
As alluded to earlier, complicated views on the relationship between Buddhism and science 
have not only been found in the West. One of the interesting things about US mindfulness is that, 
in the contemporary globalist age, mindfulness transformations bleed back into Asian Buddhisms. 
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While Ledi once claimed that science served Buddhism, it is now that the full Hegelian formula 
begins to see completion. Wilson says, “Major figures in the medicalized mindfulness movement 
are quoted by Buddhists in Buddhist settings”55. In other words, if Hegel’s argument is that religion 
eventually finds its role as support to the liberal modern scientific world—i.e. the immanent 
frame—it appears that, even in Buddhist Asia, Buddhism increasingly does support science. 
Instead of providing the dominant epistemological frame, instead of providing the raison d’être for 
everything, instead of providing means for enlightenment and other-worldly benefits, Buddhism is 
increasingly the means for people to live their lives in typical liberal modern fashion, with liberal 
modernity’s decadence and its focus on the individual experience. 
Liberal modern science and Buddhism are committed to quite different from projects from 
each other. Today, the use of mindfulness meditation practice is often divorced from its original 
associations. As Braun puts it, “[W]hatever its value, this use of mindfulness and, more broadly, 
the sort of insight practice that depends upon it are real divergences from Buddhist conceptions 
that came earlier, including that of Ledi”56. This implies three stages. First, meditation practice as 
a Buddhist practice that worked toward other-worldly ends. Second, Ledi’s conception of 
meditation as a practice consistent with earlier conceptions of Buddhisms, but also having the 
benefit of guarding Burmese Buddhism against colonial rule. Finally, liberal modern uses of 
mindfulness meditation that have nothing to do with Buddhism’s ultimate aims. 
The developing relationship between Buddhism and science has been aided by Buddhism’s 
legitimation as a tool for liberal modern psychology. McMahan says, “[T]he interface of Buddhism 
and western psychology has been one of the most prevalent frameworks of interpretation by 
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westerners and a powerful constituent of later Buddhist modernism”57. As Buddhism and US 
psychology have come into contact, Buddhism has taken on new importance in the US. Before this 
could have its full impact, though, the efficacy of meditation had to be demonstrated through 
liberal modern institutions, which brings us back to the role of Kabat-Zinn. 
Wilson says, “The universally acknowledged turning point for the mindfulness movement’s 
relationship with science and medicine is 1979, when Jon Kabat-Zinn started the Stress Reduction 
and Relaxation Program at the University of Massachusetts Medical School”58. Kabat-Zinn 
produced a body of literature, asserting that meditation produces medical benefits. He was the first 
to seriously work at legitimating meditation in liberal modern institutions, but he would not be the 
last. The very text that was so central to Ledi’s understanding of Buddhist practice—the 
Abidharma—would soon be referred to by another US Buddhist teacher and neuroscientist whose 
project was similar to Kabat-Zinn’s. 
In Daniel Goleman’s The Varieties of the Meditative Experience, he says, “The classical Buddhist 
Abhidharma is probably the broadest and most detailed traditional psychology of states of 
consciousness”59. In Goleman’s view, it is insufficient to simply claim that a famous Buddhist text 
aligns closely with liberal modern psychology; instead, the Abidharma is a seminal liberal modern 
psychology text, making major contributions to a specific subfield in liberal modern medicine. Of 
course, the Abidharma was not a liberal modern scientific text and the overarching project to 
which it intended its contribution was quite different from that of any liberal modern science. 
Liberal modern psychology’s role in disseminating mindfulness has been significant. For many 
people in the US, their contact with mindfulness has solely been through psychotherapy and 
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through medicine more broadly. McMahan explains how Buddhism’s relationship to psychology 
developed: “[R]ecent practical psychotherapies have helped detraditionalize [Buddhism], allowing 
meditation to operate in non-Buddhist therapeutic settings, often for non-Buddhist goals and 
without requiring commitment to explicitly Buddhist values”60. Through replacing meditation in 
therapeutic settings, meditation was—for many laypeople in the US—stripped of associations to 
Buddhism. Laypeople in the US were able to engage in Buddhist practices without having to 
commit to Buddhist aims or Buddhist ideas. Many people engaged in these practices without 
realizing that they had anything to do with Buddhism. This all served a valuable function to liberal 
modern medicine. 
Through the work of Kabat-Zinn and others, mindfulness was able to take on anesthetizing, 
stress-relieving, and even joy-inducing functions that could appeal to people in the US and 
elsewhere. Wilson says, 
The thing to take away from all this is how MBSR is impacting the medical and 
psychological professions, being applied to an ever-expanding list of ailments and 
conditions, and providing income and employment for a substantial pool of 
therapists, authors, editors, publishers, and others who benefit from medicalized 
mindfulness. Kabat-Zinn intended MBSR to provide right livelihood for thousands, 
by which he meant the ability to make money in ways that contributed to the health 
of others and society without violating one’s moral principles. By all appearances, 
he is well on the way to achieving this goal.61 
Again, it would seem wrong to accuse Kabat-Zinn or any of these others of having had bad 
intentions. For many people, it would surely seem better that writers were hocking books on how 
                                                        
60 McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, 57. 
61 Wilson, Mindful America, 101. 
 79 
to improve one’s life rather than books on any number of other things. Mindfulness’s increasing 
reach can be seen as ambivalent, though. On one hand, we might assume that mindfulness 
improves more and more people’s lives and that mindfulness increasingly provides more ethical 
opportunities for people to make a living. On the other hand, as mindfulness’s applications expand, 
it runs the risk of becoming more of a fetish object than something truly helpful. If mindfulness 
becomes more symbolic than substantive, then the ethics of mindfulness’s marketers comes into 
question as well. Later, this point will become important. 
Note that the discussion is no longer about whether or not the US mindfulness is clearly 
Buddhist; instead, the focus has shifted toward whether or not the US mindfulness movement is 
clearly one that opposes Buddhisms’ ethics and objectives. It is through the immanentization and 
scientization that the US mindfulness movement effaces aspects of Buddhism and, at least 
sometimes, seems to come into conflict with Buddhisms. 
 
The Contemporary US Mindfulness Movement 
 
Let ‘im hear me, I say. If he ever listened to poor colored women the world would 
be a different place, I can tell you. — Alice Walker, The Color Purple62 
 
In the US mindfulness case, Buddhism’s change has been radical enough that it no longer 
seems to make sense to refer to all iterations of US mindfulness as expressions of any Buddhism 
whatever. While mindfulness and Buddhism share some history, the present reality of mindfulness 
is such that some forms of mindfulness can no longer be clearly associated with anything 
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Buddhist—a point that will later be explained. This disassociation is partly due to the ways by 
which Buddhism has historically managed to survive. A hint for why some forms of US mindfulness 
eventually divorced from Buddhism appears in Wilson’s description of Buddhism’s transformation: 
“It is by meeting the mainstream needs of new cultures like America that Buddhism survives and 
take roots [sic], even as it is profoundly changed in the process”63. “Profoundly changed” is, in the 
case of some forms of mindfulness, an understatement. In some cases of US mindfulness, all that 
was Buddhist has been removed, only to be replaced by elements that are clearly not Buddhist. 
Buddhism’s general tendency to meet evolving and variegated needs helps to explain the 
development of what would eventually become the US mindfulness movement, but particularities 
of US modernity also help to explain some unexpected outcomes. 
McMahan helps to show how some of the shifts have appeared in US mindfulness culture. He 
says, “Popular literature in the West often presents the ‘essence’ of Buddhism as primarily about 
inner experience rather than its institutional and social realities”64. In the US, Buddhism has been 
distorted so that, for some people, Buddhism may even be exclusively about the individual. This 
ignores the institutional and social aspects of Buddhism that have always been important to Asian 
Buddhisms, even if those institutions have been culturally contingent and independent of the 
teachings of the Buddha. Still, there appears to be something in how Buddhism is represented in 
US literatures that makes it appear well-aligned with liberal modern ideas about the individual. 
McMahan continues, “This approach has created a new kind of quasi-lay community of Buddhist 
sympathizers who read popular Buddhist books and do some meditation and an occasional retreat 
but do not necessarily identify themselves exclusively as Buddhist”65. In the US, especially, many 
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non-Buddhists have appropriated aspects of Buddhism. These Buddhist aspects can serve as 
alternatives to liberal modern approaches to life. 
In most of the twentieth century, as Wilson says, “For Americans not born into the religion, 
the attraction of Buddhism usually wasn’t mindfulness, but rather its alternative worldview and the 
way Buddhism allegedly combined pacifism and ancient purity with a liberal modern scientific 
sentiment and freedom from dogma”66. Wilson is careful here to point out that the US vision of 
Buddhism is problematic. To consider some recent geopolitical histories, Buddhism’s supposed 
pacifism belies experiences in places like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and even WWII Japan.67 If the 
“purity” to which Wilson refers is something non-liberal, it would be worth pointing out that a 
non-liberal context that comes into contact with liberal modern people cannot remain purely the 
same as it had been previous to that moment. If Buddhism contains elements of liberal modern 
science, that too would complicate the supposed purity. Finally, to conclude that Buddhism is 
absolutely free from dogma seems to misunderstand Buddhism’s social history altogether. It is clear 
that some people in the US romanticized Buddhism, or, as Wilson puts it, “mystified” it.68 
Still, this mystification—of a Buddhism that had already once been transformed through 
coloniality—helped to lead to further development. Wilson says, 
[D]isparate elements—the growth of higher education; the creation of the religious 
studies discipline; the rise in Asian immigration; the founding of American 
meditation-oriented Buddhist centers; the countercultural revolution; the 
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popularity of psychology; the deepening political, military, and cultural 
entanglement in Southeast Asia; and the publishing of mindfulness travelogues by 
Western laypeople—would all contribute to the success of the mindfulness 
movement in America.69 
The mystification was, in part, a product of dominant social currents already present in the US. 
By the time practitioners of Buddhism hoped to export aspects of Buddhism to the US, these 
developments helped to overdetermine the onset of a growing awareness of Buddhism. Eventually, 
the development of the US mindfulness movement was formed into the vast and variegated 
phenomenon that it is today. 
As 20th-century understandings of, and fascinations with, Buddhism grew, an intentional 
attempt to legitimate Buddhist practices in the US appeared. Wilson says that the US mindfulness 
movement came from “three sources”: people from the US who went to Asia to learn how to 
meditate before spreading it in the US; Thich Nhat Hanh, a “modernist Vietnamese monk” (along 
with the 15th Dalai Lama, who fulfills a similar role); and Jon Kabat-Zinn, “a doctor and 
scientist”70. These three sources performed different functions. In the US, teachers trained in Asia 
began to transform and disseminate Buddhist thought. Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama 
reacted to a growing global interest in Buddhism and spirituality. Jon Kabat-Zinn’s efforts helped 
give Buddhism cachet in liberal modern scientific and medical institutions. 
One of the US mindfulness movement’s most dramatic changes to historical conceptions of 
Buddhism has been around its conception of the role of meditation, although that would later 
become further complicated. Asian Buddhisms have historically been replete with rituals, 
almsgiving, and other culturally contingent practices. While relationships between Asian 
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Buddhisms and meditation have been buried, in some schools of Buddhism, lay meditation has 
been rare. For most Asian Buddhists throughout history, meditation has not been at the center of 
Buddhist practice. Yet, in US mindfulness, meditation has been a foundational practice. It has 
increasingly become the case that mindfulness is something other than meditation, but initially, 
meditation was at the heart of mindfulness. Braun tells us of this transformation: “Outside of 
traditional Theravāda culture and without direct links to traditional Theravāda practices, they 
dispensed with almost all rituals and activities other than meditation. Although Goenka claims not 
to teach Buddhism but only pure dhamma, he assumes a traditional cosmological worldview that 
includes rebirth”71. Goenka was a lay Burmese meditation teacher who came after Ledi helped to 
spread meditation among lay people. Goenka was also an Asian Buddhist who was clearly teaching 
more than just meditation. US mindfulness has become further and further removed from the 
context within which most Buddhist meditation has been undertaken (especially until the 20th 
century): the Asian Buddhist monastery. 
For some, mindfulness might be infinitely flexible. Wilson recalls John Coleman’s The Quiet 
Mind in which Coleman says that he is 
 ‘disheartened to think that so many who live by the Buddhist faith seemed, if I 
understood his teachings at all, to miss the point. His message, surely, was that the 
truth lies within the self, that the aim of those who live by his word must be genuine 
enlightenment by transcending all the gaudy nonsense of ritual and sophisticated 
forms of worship.’ Here Coleman attempts to be faithful to the Buddha precisely by 
disclaiming aspects of Buddhism that he rejects—this isn’t a denial of Buddhist 
practice but a sifting in order to present an improved Buddhism.72 
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Coleman tells us that, in your very center, you know what Buddhism is. You only have to be willing 
to look deep within yourself. The ghost of Hegel might claim that this is the Protestant 
individualization of Buddhism to a degree that goes beyond Protestantism’s individualizing 
tendency in Christianity. Nowhere in any Christian doctrine of which I am aware is there ever a 
claim that one only need to listen closely to what is deep within them in order to achieve religious 
objectives. For Coleman, there is nothing outside the self that is necessary for enlightenment. 
Everything but the liberal modern, free, autonomous, stable, complete, desire-fulfilling, rational 
individual is extraneous to Buddhism. 
In fact, is not the Buddhism-as-connection-to-self position easily explained—overdetermined, 
perhaps? Liberal modernity’s ever-increasing personalization of human experience, combined 
with the ever-expanding use of brain sciences, seem to point directly at the self as savior. This goes 
beyond liberal modernity’s concept of individual responsibility to claim that the source of spiritual 
life is the self. One transcends earthly life by going into that which most fundamentally grounds 
one’s life: the self. Liberal modernity finds more and more ways to avail us to customized 
experiences, making us increasingly responsible for the outcomes of our lives. Psychology inundates 
us with evidence of the fact that we can take control over our emotional lives by better 
understanding ourselves. It is no wonder, then, that a social movement that is based on foreign 
religious practices—and that has become so closely associated with liberal modern psychology—
might also propose that the movement is actually about little more (in some cases, really nothing 
at all more) than listening to our hearts. 
In Janet Taylor’s Buddhism for Non-Buddhists, she makes this idea clear: “If you find a thought, a 
practice, or an action that adds value to your life, keep doing it. If not, toss it aside. Buddhism is 
the opposite of many other ‘isms’, because you are enthusiastically encouraged to think for 
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yourself”73. In and through the US mindfulness movement, Buddhism can be whatever you want 
it to be. There is no need to for any social practice or social understanding. One need not be taught. 
You are both responsible and free to partake in whatever makes your life better—whatever that 
means to you. 
It might not be surprising, then, that some conceptions of mindfulness eventually became 
independent of meditation. Referring to one mindfulness practitioner, Wilson says, “She didn’t 
engage with Buddhist practice communities directly and in fact decided that mindfulness and its 
reputed benefits could be accessed without doing any sort of traditional meditation”74. If, as I just 
stated, she was a “mindfulness practitioner,” then what does that mean? What is mindfulness if not 
meditation? How complete is the transformation and expansion of mindfulness if it no longer 
necessitates any connection to Buddhism or meditation? This practitioner does not meditate, but 
somehow, she practices something that she regards as “mindfulness.” This appears confusing if not 
nonsensical. 
McMahan says, “Paradoxically, while meditation is often considered the heart of Buddhism, it 
is also deemed the element most detachable from the tradition itself”75. On one hand, mindfulness’s 
conceivers sometimes see mindfulness as equivalent to meditation. On the other hand, the stripping 
of mindfulness’s Buddhist legacy has led to its uncontrolled transformation. 
For all mindfulness’s intended benefits, it is not clearly and exclusively a way for improving life 
on Earth, problematic as that idea may already be for some Buddhists. If part of the intention of 
US mindfulness conceivers was to make people more aware of the negative impacts that they have 
on the world, some businesspeople employ mindfulness as a tool to market commodities, some of 
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which surely contribute to forms of harm on Earth. Mindfulness is also a tool used to increase the 
efficiency and productivity of people with great power. Again, some of the outcomes of these 
people’s lives are surely destructive. Moreover, there is a lack of reverence for the important social, 
cultural, and religious functions that were always previously married to what was to become the 
US mindfulness movement. In some cases, mindfulness is now little more than an image associated 
with a particular lifestyle. It is not Asian, not Buddhist, and it is no longer necessarily associated 
with meditation. It is easier to argue that mindfulness is little more than a quirky aspect of 
capitalism than to think of mindfulness as non-liberal. 
This new conception of mindfulness has not been temporary and has not been geographically 
bounded. The influence has not been unidirectional, either. Buddhism has, since very early on, 
been transnational, and trends in one part of the Buddhist world often have effects elsewhere. 
Braun points out, “Gombrich and Obeyesekere observed in the 1980s that in Sri Lanka many 
laypeople had come to understand meditation as a tool for success in daily life. And, what is more, 
teachers in Asia […] have noted the practical benefits of meditation”76. Now, in Asia, the practice 
of meditation is undertaken for reasons not having to do with other-worldly concerns. 
Part of this trend comes from the development of the mindfulness movement primarily in the 
US. Wilson says, “[M]indfulness’s traditional Buddhist context is eroded away, a process of 
mystification necessary to make it available for a wider range of new American pursuits”77. So, as 
US individualistic, consumerist culture produced its own version of mindfulness, it furthered 
deterioration of Buddhist other-worldly concerns as the ultimate raison d’être of meditation. 
McMahan says, “[W]esterners have contributed significantly to transforming Buddhism in 
highly selective and idiosyncratic ways in terms of the categories, ideologies, and narratives of their 
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own culture”78. The US has helped to transform Asian Buddhisms, but the loosening of 
meditation’s associations with other-worldly concerns has not been the only way by which Asian 
Buddhisms have changed. Thinking back to Hegel’s point from the beginning of this essay, 
Buddhisms (in Asia and elsewhere) are now having to react to liberal modernism’s individualizing 
tendency, as well as to Taylor’s immanent frame. Aspects of Buddhism can now serve a broader 
liberal modern ideology. In the US, there are some iterations of mindfulness that appear as purely 
aesthetic specifications of liberal modern, individualistic, desire-fulfilling, this-worldly practice. 
There need be no association to do with anything Buddhistic whatsoever. 
 
Complicated Ends of US Mindfulness 
 
“Your duty is to work, not to reap the fruits of work. 
Do not go for the rewards of what you do 
but neither be fond of laziness. 
 
“Steady in Yoga, do whatever you must do; 
give up attachment, be indifferent to failure and success. 
This equilibrium is Yoga. 
 
“Selfish work is inferior 
to the work of a balanced, uncoveting mind; shelter 
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your in this mental stability, Arjuna. 
Harassed are the runners after actions’ fruits. 
 
“With this mental poise, 
you will release yourself from evil and good deeds. 
Devote yourself to this Yoga— 
it is the secret of success in work.” — The Bhagavadgita79 
 
Ledi was in a difficult position, but his response may have seemed to him to be the obvious 
one. Surely, if his main goal was to preserve Burmese Buddhism and Burmese culture, his strategy 
was successful. He must have recognized that the changes that he was proposing—dramatically 
increased lay meditation and lay study—were radical ones. One would think that the challenge of 
preserving these aspects of culture in the face of British colonialism must have proved daunting. 
Yet, Ledi’s diligence and innovativeness helped to allow Burmese Buddhism and Burmese culture 
to continue to thrive. 
The intentions of the US mindfulness crowd were clearly very different. Like many in the 1968 
movements, US mindfulness was initially about increasing one’s ability to live an authentic life, 
free from all the clouded influence of opaque authority, liberal modernity’s ideological greyness, 
and the ways by which liberal modern society mass produces the fragments that make up our 
subjectivities. US mindfulness was about individual liberation from the oppressions of liberal 
modern social formations. 
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In the US mindfulness movement, there was certainly no threat of physical or cultural 
annihilation. While it may be that (I would argue that there was) liberal modern society placed 
unfair limits and unfair burdens on liberal modern subjects, the oppression was not equivalent to 
the absolute eradication of one’s history, one’s way of life, and one’s people altogether. Luckily, 
Burma never experienced something so extreme, either, but we can see how the colonialists did 
effect such devastations in other cases, and the Burmese had good reasons to fear dramatic 
outcomes. 
It is easy to say that the 1968 movements were, in part, largely about privileged liberal moderns 
pursuing greater individual freedoms—more privilege. This may be true enough, but it is also true 
that there is a long, well-documented history of liberal moderns feeling a deep sense of 
discontentment with their social roles. Liberal modernity and capitalism may provide us with a lot 
for which we can be thankful, but it also seems to take something of our humanity. There are real 
problems with liberal modern life for which we might feel a good deal of sympathy. 
Still, the US mindfulness movement’s privilege and the residue of liberal modern and colonial 
thinking clearly led to outcomes that follow recognizable patterns. The immanentizing and 
scientizing of mindfulness led to the effacement of aspects of Buddhism and to Buddhists, 
themselves. This led to the absurd situation by which Buddhism became a sign for which there was 
no necessary particular signification—according to some, “Buddhism” could mean anything at all. 
The oppressions wrought by the US mindfulness movement have surely been mostly unintentional, 
but as we will see, the tendency for this movement to follow predictable colonial patterns has, in 
some ways, caused as much harm as it has caused good. That is a complicated claim that we will 
have to carefully lay out and complicate.
 Chapter Three 
The Business of Mindfulness: 
Unexpected Outcomes in the US Mindfulness Movement 
 
And she been going on for months bout how ungrateful I is. 
White folks is a miracle of affliction, say Sofia. — Alice Walker, The Color Purple1 
 
Thus far, we have discussed the cultural significance of the changes to Buddhism that have 
manifested as US mindfulness. What has not yet been discussed in great detail are the conditions 
that have contributed to mindfulness’s current form nor the economic consequences of US 
mindfulness. What should be clear by now is that, previous to the 20th century, Buddhism 
advocated for detachment from earthly concerns. Historically, Buddhist monks have generally 
lived ascetic lives as a means of helping to bring about decreased suffering. In mindfulness, we see 
something opposite to this: Buddhist practices help people enjoy what life has to offer. 
Because the US mindfulness movement does not attack the foundations of liberal modernity, 
it acquiesces to the norm. The immanent frame and capitalism—as thick bundles of forces in 
contemporary society—lie near the heart of today’s cultural reality and cultural forcefulness. When 
a countercultural movement appears, it is either of the sort that can be attached with the same 
concerns of corporate suburbanites who might eat organic and choose a hybrid SUV or it is more 
likely the sort that is difficult for anyone to adopt unless that person is willing to make profound 
sacrifices. 
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I have no desire to shame anyone or to proselytize. My point is that there is sometimes a lack 
of clarity when we conceive of social change. I also do not mean to propose that this is purely an 
either/or scenario. It could be that the US mindfulness movement, with minor alterations, could 
be one that brings about dramatic social change for the better. 
Still, in its current form, we have to concede that the US mindfulness movement is more 
capitalist than radical—a milquetoast New Age-y aesthetic that is more linked to astrological charts 
and crystals than to Zapatismo or smashing the state. Again, this is a false dichotomy, but I hope that 
my point is clear. 
What emerges from this recognition is the point that the US mindfulness movement, then, has 
some cultural effect on its participants. People who feel that there is something wrong in liberal 
modern culture might look to mindfulness to provide some answers and some relief, and they might 
at least get some personal relief. It can be easy to feel that, by doing a little bit of something, at least 
we are not contributing to the whole problematic mess that happens under the prevailing 
paradigm. I do not presume this to be fully wrong. What I must insist is not true, though, is that, 
by joining a Theravāda Zen psychological Nag Champa alternative Pema Chödrön book club, we 
are doing something very significant toward overturning the prevailing socio-cultural paradigm. 
 
Happiness and Contentment: 
A Conflict Between Liberal Modernity and Buddhism 
 
The bird was fighting its way out of the egg. The egg is the world. Whoever 
wishes to be born must destroy a world. The bird is flying to God. The God is 
named Abraxas. — Hermann Hesse, Demian2 
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In Ledi’s Manual on the Factors of Awakening, he says, 
As for some people, they say they will be freed easily when the proper time comes 
with the fulfillment of their perfections, but that they cannot take up the burden [of 
meditation] now, when they do not know whether or not they can become freed. 
They are scared of the burden. They do not seem to compare the suffering of 
making an effort in meditation now for thirty years with the suffering that will occur 
if they descend to hell for one hundred thousand years before getting the chance to 
free themselves easily.3 
Previous to Ledi, meditation played little, if any, role in the lives of most Burmese Buddhists. As 
Ledi increasingly added pressure to change that, he met resistance. The idea of widespread lay 
meditation was new and possibly seemed cumbersome. In Ledi’s view, some people could be freed 
of this world’s suffering, but that would require meditation. At the very least, a good reason to 
meditate would be so that the meditator could avoid “one hundred thousand years” of torture. 
Ledi could leverage fears of negative outcomes in order to help to spread meditation. This might 
mark a change of emphasis as Ledi’s popularization of meditation reframed the practice. So long 
as Buddhist thought and practice remained in this world, meditation could be viewed as helping 
lay people to avoid suffering in this world and the next. The value of meditation in the US is 
something very different. 
The relationship between the US mindfulness movement and desire is one that is quite different 
from the historical relationship between Asian Buddhisms and desire. Still, there is something non-
liberal about US mindfulness. McMahan says,  
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For all its accommodation to modern life, meditation still has been enlisted as an 
implicit critique and an antidote to some of the destructive elements of that life: its 
frenetic pace, its material nihilism, it consumption-driven ethos, its convulsive 
violence. Many of the things contemporary meditation teachers invite students to 
use meditation to ‘see through’ are none other than these illnesses of modernity—
including its excessive individualism itself.4 
The slowness, connectedness, intentionality, and calm of mindfulness seem to provide some 
counterbalance to what are, for so many people, complications to liberal modern life. People are 
not satisfied with the alienating and destructive aspects of modernity, so a turn to mindfulness 
might provide relief. Also, mindfulness can help people to more closely inspect their lives and the 
factors in their environments that lead them to where they are, emotionally and otherwise. There 
is at least something that modern consumers seem to value in mindfulness. 
Braun describes the contemporary earthly value of US modern mindfulness meditation as 
largely couched in the therapeutic.5 What should be clear by this point is that the transformation 
of Buddhist meditation occurred through a liberal modern scientific and medical understanding of 
the world—or, through the dominant secularistic immanent frame. 
It should be noted here that the therapeutic sense to which Braun refers has a clear relationship 
with what Sara Ahmed calls “compulsory happiness”6. In the US, the emphasis placed on the 
instant, fleeting gratification of enjoyment often comes at the expense of the satisfaction and 
contentment that can come from disciplined practice and self-reflection. This sometimes leads to 
a sense of failure when someone feels any sort of pain. It sometimes leads to a constant search for 
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novelty and ephemeral emotional highs. For much of the mindfulness movement, the emphasis is 
on the achievement of these kinds of fleeting positive feelings. In the high-stress, fast-paced US—
and especially for “usually white, middle or upper class” practitioners7—the psychological benefits 
of mindfulness have proved to be appealing. Braun says, 
Much of the development in the United States must be credited to American 
culture’s emphasis on well-being, a romantic impulse toward mystical experience, 
and a psychological approach to meditative practice. Nonetheless, the links from 
Ledi to Thetgyi to U Ba Khin to Goenka, along with Ledi’s formative influence on 
the context in which Mingun and Mahasi operated, led to the training of Goldstein, 
Kornfield, and Salzberg and, subsequently, the teaching of Kabat-Zinn.8 
Here, Braun makes two points. First, in the US, happiness and the allure of the “mystical” help to 
determine the popularity of mindfulness. We might imagine that the earliest buyers—proverbial 
or otherwise—of mindfulness were interested both in alternative lifestyles and in improved 
psychological welfare. The slowness, calmness, and awareness of Buddhist meditation might both 
fill a spiritual void and improve one’s emotional health. Braun’s second point is that the 
development of mindfulness follows a trajectory set by Ledi, his contemporaries, and their students. 
For potential US mindfulness practitioners, what was missing from earlier forms of Buddhism was 
the emphasis on its potential contributions to people’s positive feelings. 
This brings up a kind of semantic problem. Is Braun—or am I—suggesting that it would be 
preferable if people did not experience positive feelings? Of course not. Instead, there is a clear 
difference between what is meant by “happiness” in an individualistic, desire-emphasizing, 
commodity-driven, exploitative, rationalistic liberal modern frame and what might be meant by 
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“happiness,” or perhaps “contentment,” in a society that does not privilege the individual, does 
not privilege ephemeral desires, does not privilege the commodity, does not needlessly exploit, and 
does not privilege the rational over the embodied or the emotional. 
In the US, it may be that the fulfillment of desires only leads to more desires, but this hardly 
appears to be a problem. The logic for Buddhist practitioners in the US, according to Wilson, goes 
something like this: “For Americans, then, the proper response to impermanence is to drink as 
deeply as possible from the cup of life because it may be removed at any moment”9. Enjoy life 
while you can, and let Buddhism help you to do so. There is only so much time to appreciate the 
earthly pleasures that the world has to offer. 
It should be said that satisfaction only appears as the consequence of a negative emotion. What 
I mean is that there is no satisfaction without dissatisfaction; one cannot feel satisfied without feeling 
that there is some need or desire to satisfy. Something must be missing. It seems important to note 
the general dissatisfaction so often expressed in modernity (melancholy, alienation, and boredom 
all seem to be particularly modern problems) at the same time as the possibility of a decreased 
sense of unsatisfaction outside modernity. It may be just as useful to a person’s emotional welfare 
if they decrease unsatisfaction as it is to satisfy desires. The point of satisfaction is not to accrue 
achievements and acquisitions, but the qualitative emotional experience of non-dissatisfaction, or 
contentment. If, as Asian Buddhists and Lacanians have suggested, the secret to contentment is to 
be aware of, and bracket off, desire, this makes some sense. By pushing desires to the side—rather 
than focusing on fulfilling them—our emotional welfare might be less reliant on fulfillments of 
desires. What we then might feel is the absence of dissatisfaction: contentment. It bears repeating 
that the quantitative fulfillment of desires seems more likely to lead to more desires needing to be 
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fulfilled. There is a kind of irony in the notion that fulfillment of desires, then, might only lead to 
increased dissatisfaction. There is no reason to suspect that the fulfillment of some number of 
desires might lead to the end of the unsatisfaction experienced as desire. Again, the way that I am 
conceiving of this issue is to distinguish between liberal modern desire-based “happiness” and 
something more sustainable that I am calling “contentment.” 
Happiness appears to be key to the US mindfulness phenomenon. As Wilson puts it, “In the 
case of the mindfulness movement, we find that one of the highest values is the sacredness of 
happiness”10. I doubt seriously that Wilson genuinely finds anything sacred about the virtue of 
happiness. Certainly, Buddhism seems to have no particular interest in happiness—especially not 
happiness in the sense that Wilson or I might be using the term. Yet, if one were to observe the US 
mindfulness movement from within the movement, we might assume that the average US 
practitioner of mindfulness might find the means to everlasting joy. 
Whether it is joy or something else that mindfulness consumers are buying into, the experience 
of, or the image of, meditation does not seem to explain the breadth of mindfulness consumption. 
Wilson describes advertising for mindfulness: “Perhaps the most interesting thing to observe of all 
is that there are no full photographs or drawings whatsoever of people actually doing sitting 
meditation, and just a handful with bits of people that by their posture or hand positioning suggest 
that they could be meditating. Mindfulness does not mean meditation, or at least, meditation 
doesn’t sell mindfulness”11. Images of what has previously been meant by “mindfulness” do not sell 
mindfulness. If it is not meditation that people are seeking, then it is hard to determine exactly 
what people are intending to buy. People want something that is offered by mindfulness, but it does 
not appear to be mindfulness itself. Yet, mindfulness survives. No—actually, mindfulness seems to 
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be a growing phenomenon.12 It is a growing industry and awareness of mindfulness seems to be 
growing. 
Mindfulness appears as the commodified means for achieving some liberal modern ideal. 
Mindfulness is one tool among many for helping to provide people with something(s) that they 
lack. Asian Buddhisms may have historically concluded that extinguishment of desire was the way 
to end suffering, but US mindfulness does not always take this position. Like with any commodity, 
it is the job of marketers to illuminate the supposed lack in order to suggest the solution. In the case 
of the US mindfulness movement, what is missing is some conceptually elusive thing that we call 
“mindfulness,” itself. Wilson clarifies: “Similar to the before and after photos of television 
infomercials for miraculous diets and bodybuilding contraptions, mindfulness pitchmen describe 
how they and their clients were once stressed out and unhappy, but now thanks to mindfulness 
they are blissed out and happy”13. If we were not aware, what is missing from our lives is 
“mindfulness.” For a price (of some sort or another), there is a remedy. In some cases, at least, it 
seems that mindfulness is positioned as the cure-all for one’s emotional realm. 
Like many products that people consume, mindfulness is sold on the supposed promise of its 
own experience. Wilson says, “[M]indfulness is used to make money in connection with various 
products, including mindfulness itself”14. While Wilson does not go into an exhaustive explanation 
of this, what might be said is that US mindfulness gives something to US practitioners that they 
had been lacking—it provides some relief or some temporary joy. A US model of consumer 
capitalism suggests that the emotional goal is always achieved ephemerally through consumption. 
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Happiness that comes from consumption is too short-lived to not demand more consumption. Why 
would it not then be the case that, after consuming mindfulness, the achievement of one’s (always 
necessarily deferred, then) goals always depends on the consumption of even more mindfulness? 
Again, in Asian Buddhisms, there was never a question of the ethics of marketing meditation. 
Prior to Ledi, Buddhist meditation was only ever a religious practice undertaken in socially 
constructed religious contexts. There was no marketing, as such, and no significant spread of 
meditation beyond its normal dispersion associated with its religious association (in some schools, 
this meant meditation as a monastic practice while other Buddhist traditions more greatly 
propagated lay meditation). The traditional role of meditation and mindfulness (as well as of all 
other aspects of Buddhism) was always ultimately in the service of other-worldly concerns. 
Even if many Buddhists have meditated in part for the purpose of achieving this-worldly 
benefits, Buddhist doctrine teaches that people should learn to be disconnected from earthly 
concerns. Perhaps as in any religion, we might assume that the “perfect Buddhist” is a rare one. 
Still, according to Buddhist doctrine, earthly desires distract people from the greater mission of 
enabling less suffering among sentient beings. Clearly, the US mindfulness movement sees 
meditation differently. As Braun puts it, “Now meditation is meant not as an escape-hatch from 
rebirth but as a way to make life more enjoyable, richer, more stress-free, even sexier”15. 
Mindfulness has increasingly come to be used—not just to treat a number of physical ailments, 
but—to help people to better enjoy their lives in various and unexpected ways. This difference 
might partly be explained by different cultures surrounding the notion of consumption. 
The economics of Asian Buddhisms are necessarily different from those of mindfulness because 
Asian Buddhisms have traditionally advocated for the renunciation of earthly desires. McMahan 
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points out the strangeness of mindfulness’s relationship to the material world: “What is ironic about 
the use of Buddhist mindfulness techniques to approach more skillfully the complex vicissitudes of 
modern life—work, family, social and political life—is that these techniques were originally 
developed by monks who had ostensibly renounced these very things”16. Buddhist practice’s 
traditional context necessitated that these practices be divorced from earthly desires. In the 
contemporary mindfulness movement—and increasingly in Asian Buddhisms, as well—earthly 
interests motivate mindfulness practice. The US mindfulness movement’s is made up of liberal 
modern, individualistic, desiring subjects, most of whom are well-invested in the US good life. 
 
The Economics of US Mindfulness 
 
It seems to be easier for us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of 
the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late capitalism; perhaps that is due 
to some weakness in our imaginations. — Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time17 
 
The role of renunciation in the US is different from its historical role in Asian Buddhisms. 
Wilson says: “Renunciation, in the American Buddhist world, is a world-affirming and self-fulfilling 
practice partially couched in the spiritual language of world-abnegation and self-denial”18. This 
particular shift—from a fuller renunciation to a renunciation that might sometimes only be as 
superficial as the language that is used—might tell us something about the nature of the 
relationship between mindfulness and economic consumption in the US. Modern liberal 
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economics prioritizes profit above all else, which means that it also prioritizes increased profits.19 
Because profit requires consumption, increasing consumption is inevitable. George Ritzer, et al. 
help to make this clear in their essay, “The Coming Age of the Prosumer”20. What Ritzer highlights 
is that profit requires both production and consumption. Production does not count21 unless it is 
consumed and there is no consumption without production. There may be an obviousness to this, 
but the point that is important here is that profit plays a significant role in determining US 
mindfulness’s transformation of Buddhist renunciation. Because US mindfulness is conceived in a 
modern context, subject to modern liberal economics, the association between mindfulness and 
consumption makes sense. Instead of mindfulness being linked to decreased consumption, as 
history might predict, mindfulness helps to increase consumption. 
Perhaps, one of the reasons that individuality and prosumption seem so often to ally in 
modernity is that modernity assumes no doctrine or set of social norms that rule over the individual 
sufficient to preclude prosumption. Liberal modernity often nests social ethics beneath ethics of the 
self rather than nesting the needs of the individual beneath concerns of a broader nature. In 
Buddhism, or in any religious society, it is reasonable to think that constraints on prosumption 
might appear. In part, this is because religions are necessarily social and they have social concerns 
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example. 
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that trump emphasis on the individual. In liberal modernity, there is no reason to assume these 
constraints. One might imagine the modern wisdom of minding one’s own business. People can act as 
they please (within some set of constraints22) in order to achieve whatever goals they have in mind. 
For a more economic explanation of increased prosumption, the increase of prosumption is 
facilitated by an ever-expanding set of possible material desires.23 So long as there is more to 
prosume, and so long as profit will increase as prosumption increases, there will almost 
undoubtedly be increased prosumption. For this reason, compulsory happiness—liberal modern 
happiness of the temporary, largely commodity-driven sort—better supports economic growth 
than does a conception of well-being that revolves around long-term and commodity-independent 
contentment. The liberal modern individual is one who always desires more in order to chase an 
ephemeral high.24 
It may be helpful to focus on some examples. Mindfulness has been used to market different 
products and practices, helping people to enjoy a wide variety of human experiences. Mindful eating 
may be a movement all its own. There is a body of literature intended to teach people how to enjoy 
a healthier relationship with their food consumption practices. Wilson uses Jan Bays’s Mindful Eating 
as an example: “‘Mindfulness helps you fall in love with the ordinary.’ Time and again, these 
authors stress that the act of eating can be pleasurable, not something to be detached from. 
‘Mindful eating is a way to reawaken our pleasure in simply eating, simply drinking,’ Jan Bays 
                                                        
22 While I certainly mean to imply that modernism tends to concern itself with increasing people’s 
freedom from constraints, I do not mean to imply that there are absolutely no laws or social norms 
that tend to constrain people’s behaviors. Sometimes, the apparent indecency of an act surely leads 
to its deligitimation. 
23 Zsolnai. “Western Economics Versus Buddhist Economics.” 
24 To be clear, it is almost certainly the case that this conception of desire is inspired by Jacques 
Lacan’s 1949 paper “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience.” 
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states”25. The act of eating is, in fact, one that is addressed by Buddhism. However, mindful eating 
in Asian Buddhisms is, in some ways, meant to achieve the opposite of what is intended in the US 
iteration of mindful eating. Mindful eating in Asian Buddhisms encourages the banalization and 
utilitarianization of eating—eating for the sake of increased awareness, yes, but also for the sake of 
effecting Buddhism’s other-worldly objectives. Mindful eating in Asian Buddhisms has historically 
been a means for detachment from this world, for discipline, and, ultimately, for decreasing the 
suffering of sentient beings. 
Mindful eating, in the US context, is about enjoying life on Earth and about being free from 
pain and discomfort. Wilson, describing the practice of mindful eating, says, “[H]ere the solution 
is to heal one’s soul (Buddhism explicitly denies the existence of a soul) by giving it what it craves 
(rather than cultivating detachment and equanimity)”26. As Wilson makes clear, the whole 
formulation of mindful eating is reversed. Through US mindful eating, the autonomous individual 
nourishes their soul by nourishing their body. Instead of cultivating discipline and detachment so 
that one is less focused on the distractions of desires, we are encouraged to fulfill desires. In Asian 
Buddhisms, part of the reason to deny pleasures is to avoid the false notion that we are independent 
subjects and that our desires are meaningful through their relationships to our essential selves. 
Instead, the assumption is that what we imagine as “selves” is illusory: our “selves” are completely 
contingent on our karma and on the situations into which we are born. In essence, the fulfillment 
of desires helps to reinforce a notion of the self, only leading us to distraction from reality and 
distraction from the means to fulfilling Buddhism’s primary other-worldly goals. 
The distractions to which US mindfulness avails itself are like a smorgasbord of earthly delights. 
Mindfulness, it turns out, seems to have a great number of applications. We could go one-by-one 
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to elaborate all of the applications proposed by mindfulness’s marketers, and we would almost 
certainly fall far short of fully capturing the phenomenon. Wilson illuminates a particularly 
interesting example: “With this infinite flexibility of momentariness or completeness, of ease or 
strenuousness, of preferred framework, and its proliferative employment to enhance virtually any 
activity that seems reasonable to the individual (Mindful Horsemanship: Daily Inspirations for Better 
Communications with Your Horse), mindfulness is the ultimate Buddhist product”27. Mindfulness 
simultaneously seems to represent fleeting joy and eternal contentment, effortlessness and 
discipline, science and religion. It seems to have an appropriate role in any activity in any sphere. 
Whatever you want from a commodity might be enhanced by mindfulness. 
Here, we are tracing a certain trajectory: mindfulness in the US movement goes from a 
transformation of renunciation to a practice that helps you in any activity. Finally, mindfulness 
appears devoid of the central aspect of Buddhism that mindfulness’s conceivers tried to keep intact: 
meditation. In other words, the last step is to completely remove any Buddhist association. Wilson 
describes an example of this particular innovation: 
Real-World Mindfulness Training™ (RWMT) was created by Maya Frost, a 
mindfulness coach and practitioner of Buddhism for more than thirty years who 
found that many of her clients were attracted to mindfulness but repelled by 
meditation (that such a division could be conceptually coherent just goes to prove 
the power of previous efforts at mystifying and mainstreaming mindfulness…).28 
By this point, mindfulness no longer requires any aspect of Buddhism to mimic. It attempts to 
evoke an image of something that never was. It is what Claude Lévi-Strauss calls a “floating 
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signifier”29—a symbol for nothing. In other words, mindfulness once was shorthand for something 
Buddhistic or something to do with meditation; now, “mindfulness” in the US is an empty idea 
that cannot clearly refer to any particular thing. Is it Buddhist? Is it meditation of some sort? Is it 
countercultural? Is it altermodern? “Yes” to all and “No” to all. 
It makes sense, then, that mindfulness practice comes with any number of ancillary 
commodities for making its practice—in various contexts—more comfortable, more authentic, and 
more enjoyable. Mindfulness makes anything more pleasant, and lots of things enhance the 
experience of mindfulness. People with sufficient means purchase mindfulness-enhancing 
products. Wilson quotes the advertisement for a popular meditation cushion: “Your meditation 
cushion is so much more than an ergonomic tool. Over time, it becomes your beloved 
companion”30. To be clear, Buddhist doctrine does not suggest that any cushion should make 
meditation more effective or more valuable. While it may be normal to want a companion, 
Buddhist doctrine finds attachment to aspects of this material world to be counterproductive in 
efforts to achieve Buddhism’s other-worldly objectives. This cushion is not a Buddhist product, but 
a US liberal modern consumerist mindfulness one. 
In other products associated with US mindfulness, aspects that appear alternative to liberal US 
modernity—Asianness, spirituality, New Age-iness, etc.—also become hollowed-out images.31 
Those images are used to sell products rather than actually embodying anything anti-liberal as may 
be inferred by the historical significances of these signifiers. For example, Wilson says of the 
apparent alterity of some products: “Many of the American-made products have ancestors in Asia, 
                                                        
29 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
1987. 63. 
30 Ibid., 137. 
31 What Jean Baudrillard might refer to as simulacra of simulacra, i.e. copies of things that fail to 
have a referent. See his 1981 book, Simulacra and Simulation. 
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but that pedigree is sometimes little more than an echo. Other products are wholly inventions of 
the West, but conform to uses and styles that complement the pan-Asian feel of the total catalog”32. 
As Wilson said, mid-20th century counterculture movements often looked to Asian cultures to find 
other ways of living. Here, Asian-inspired commodities might be meant to invoke some utopic 
imaginary from some previous generation—all in the name of hocking mass-produced, 
misappropriated, kitschy counterculture-ish alternativa. If these commodities appear as farcical 
misappropriations, there are forms of US mindfulness culture that demonstrate no desire to shy 
away from more egregious modern appropriations. 
If Buddhism can be used “to enhance virtually any activity,” it stands to reason that any 
number of commodities could be sold as mindful versions of themselves. Mindfulness becomes 
fetishized in a way that facilitates the marketing of health and wellness products, food, breathmints, 
real estate, financial products, and a whole host of other sorts of commodities.33 
It turns out that mindfulness is responsible for a rather large industry. As Wilson puts it, “Over 
the past three decades, mindfulness has gone from being an obscure Asian religious technique to a 
widely touted panacea and a serious money-making industry. A government survey in 2007 found 
that more than 20 million Americans used meditation for health reasons; and Americans spent 
$4.2 billion on mindfulness-related health practices in 2009”34. If Kabat-Zinn and friends aimed 
to find a more ethical way for more people to make more money, one could argue that they have 
been successful. Hopefully, it is by now clear that this sort of attachment to materiality runs counter 
to Buddhist conceptions of Buddhism’s ultimate aims. 
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Perhaps the perfect mindful prosumer appears in what Kimberly Wilson calls the 
“tranquilista.” She says, “A tranquilista is a woman who embraces her many sides: she is spiritual 
(she’s a tranquility-seeker), creative (loves style), and entrepreneurial (calls her own shots)”35. The 
tranquil fashionista is probably not the calm ascetic that Kabat-Zinn might have envisaged. What 
it is to be a sort of lotus position Bohemian CEO is hard for this author to imagine. Kimberly 
Wilson certainly does not speak for all US mindfulness practitioners, but the fact that Buddhism 
could be transformed to the point of fully endorsing so much of modern consumer capitalist culture 
is worth noting. While this iteration of mindfulness may seem strange, if we consider the 
demographics to whom US mindfulness primarily appeals, it becomes a little clearer how this 
iteration might have emerged. 
Mindfulness caters to a narrow band of privileged people in the US, and mindfulness is 
generally associated with improving people’s happiness. Wilson says, “Mindfulness is now a tool 
for managing mainstream middle-class concerns around self-image, health, relationships, work and 
children, reinforcing rather than challenging the status quo”36. If Kabat-Zinn, and his co-creators 
of US mindfulness, had intended for mindfulness to change the US psyche or the US culture, it 
seems more obvious that US culture changed mindfulness than it does that the former occurred. 
Certainly, mindfulness seems to have done nothing at all to undermine people’s propensities to 
consume, to overwork themselves, or to be generally invested in the panoply of liberal modern 
interests more generally. 
Part of what might explain interest in emotional welfare in the US is the degradation of people’s 
emotional welfare—specifically through the frenetic pace of liberal modern life. If one major 
component of US culture is its boundless consumerism, it is perhaps equally defined by its ever-
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increasing pace and its ever-increasing demand for productive activity.37 It seems reasonable 
enough that people might crave something slower. In Kabat-Zinn’s Coming to Our Senses, he says, 
It is now harder to pay attention to any one thing and there is more to pay attention 
to. We are easily diverted and more easily distracted. We are continuously 
bombarded with information, appeals, deadlines, communications. Things come at 
us fast and furious, relentlessly. And almost all of it is man-made; it has thought 
behind it, and more often than not, an appeal to either our greed or our fears. These 
assaults on our nervous system continually stimulate and foster desire and agitation 
rather than contentedness and calmness.38 
This quotation might help to explain why mindfulness meditation might be so helpful to so many 
in the US. It could be said that many forms of meditation entail little more than simply paying 
attention to some mental object for an extended period of time. If there is something to be gained 
by one’s ability to focus, then meditation could certainly seem helpful. Kabat-Zinn here asserts 
that the liberal modern subject is one whose attention is constantly divided, always requiring the 
completion of more and more tasks. Kabat-Zinn finds that the loss of ability to focus, and the 
increased pressure and increased occupation of our time and energy, is harmful. According to 
Kabat-Zinn, the scatteredness of our minds is individually bothersome, but perhaps it also can lead 
to a society full of “greed,” “fear,” “distraction,” “desire,” and “agitation.” At least for Kabat-Zinn, 
mindfulness seems to be a social project as well as an individual happiness-inducing one. 
                                                        
37 David Graeber might certainly contend that we increasingly take on what he calls “bullshit jobs” 
(see his 2018 book Bullshit Jobs), but this is not particularly relevant to the point that I am here 
making. Graeber contends that much of what we do in the workplace does not contribute to the 
production of anything; my point is that we are continually being tasked with contributing to 
various kinds of accomplishments—whether those be bullshit tasks at bullshit jobs or caring for our 
families or producing something through a hobby or anything whatsoever that produces any kind 
of material outcome. 
38 Wilson, Mindful America, 167. 
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It is not only the increasing pace of modern life that is emotionally problematic. In the same 
book, Kabat-Zinn elaborates on the change in people’s attention. He concludes that the “loss has 
been compounded by the digital revolution” 39. There is interesting literature on technology’s role 
in the transformation of modern consciousness.40 It seems that technology makes it increasingly 
difficult to pay attention in a deep and lasting way. With so many applications on so many devices 
demanding that we monitor them at all times, for various notifications, the fraction of our attention 
that we can devote to any one thing seems minuscule. 
If people’s attention is constantly divided, if they are constantly impelled to produce at an 
increasingly more rapid pace, and if people are always unsatisfied by those things that they 
consume in order to try to feel satisfied, perhaps there are relationships between these. If we are 
called to always produce more, at a faster rate, and of a greater variety, then this must mean that 
the time that we spend on any particular task must decrease. Our attention is divided by the 
constant need to do more and to do more increasingly quickly. The limited time that we spend 
focusing on any particular thing bears on satisfaction. Whether we realize it or not, there is always 
a temporality to satisfaction. “Her hunger was satisfied,” “they satisfied their quota,” “the group’s 
thirst for vengeance was finally satisfied,” etc. Satisfaction always requires time. Perhaps, because 
we spend less time engaging in things that are meant to satisfy us, satisfaction in liberal modernity 
is always incomplete—and perhaps even increasingly so (as our time continues to be more divided). 
We might imagine that, long ago, people engaged in activities at rates that were not rushed, and 
that left them feeling more satisfied more often. As we engage in more and more tasks—at a faster 
and faster rate—and as those tasks leave us less and less satisfied, dissatisfactions pile up at a faster 
rate than they did before. 
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In the spirit of prosumption, mindfulness becomes a product targeted at helping people to be 
more productive. People’s desires and emotional welfare are a kind of problematic for US 
businesses and for employees. It is no wonder that mindfulness—as a means of helping to create 
greater emotional well-being—gets deployed in the workplace. As Wilson says, “Mindfulness is 
also being applied to make happier, more effective workers”41. Mindfulness not only assists the 
consumption side of prosumption—by cultivating desires—it also assists the production side. 
Companies have long figured that workers who are more focused, and less distracted by stress, are 
workers who are more likely to produce more efficiently. If profit is what businesses are offer, then 
increasing prosumption by all means necessary makes good business sense. 
Rather than contributing to other-worldly Buddhist aims, mindfulness appears as the 
commodified means for achieving some kind of liberal modern ideal. I grant that this ideal is a 
specific one, sometimes with undertones of countercultural and spiritual movements of earlier and 
present times. These undertones manifest in mindfulness’s contemporary, US-based specificities, 
including the appearance of subtle subversiveness. But, rather than undermining the liberal 
modern social paradigm, mindfulness does not appear to be any threat. In the case of so many 
resistance movements, alternate conceptions of culture are hollowed out and repurposed to make 
capitalism more resilient. For anyone who might be compelled to object to capitalism or any of 
capitalism’s problems, mindfulness’s apparently alteritous juxtaposition to capitalism could be 
enough to re-contain that person’s discontentment.42 What I mean by this is that there may be 
those who are driven to overturn capitalism, but the apparent alterity of mindfulness could redirect 
some of the energy that could go into such ambitions. A sufficient sense of hope might inoculate 
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the person’s psyche against their discomfort. That is all to say that, rather than opposing capitalism 
or liberal modernity, mindfulness might simply help to sidestep certain threats to social order. 
 
Political Psychology and Decoloniality 
 
He obeyed the Party, but he still hated the Party. In the old days he had hidden a 
heretical mind beneath an appearance of conformity. Now he had retreated a step 
further: in the mind he had surrendered, but he had hoped to keep the inner heart 
inviolate. He knew that he was in the wrong, but he preferred to be in the 
wrong. ― George Orwell, 198443 
 
In Braun’s book, he refers to a famous Burmese statue of the Buddha. Each hand on the statue 
is turned out to reveal its palms. On one palm is the Burmese word for “knowledge” and on the 
other palm is the Burmese word for “mindfulness.” Braun explains, “In order to make the image 
meaningful, [Ledi] denies its material reality in favor of what he sees lying behind it. He makes the 
statue, so to speak, disappear, replaced by a psychological state of awareness to which it 
purportedly refers.” The Buddha was a person who became something greater than a person by 
embodying certain attributes and actions that allowed for his enlightenment. The statue becomes 
an especially important Burmese religious site because Ledi tied study and meditation so closely to 
well-established other-worldly goals, as well as to more individualistic goals that were enabled by 
Ledi’s dissemination of meditation. The statue, then, marks a bridge between the Burmese 
Buddhism that preceded British colonialism and a contemporary Burmese Buddhism that now 
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more clearly expresses liberal modern concerns. Ledi’s purpose for emphasizing study and 
meditation was to form a durable Burmese identity during British colonialism. The shift—from 
meditation as a Buddhist monastic ritual practice that maintained a relationship to the other-
worldly—to a widespread, more this-worldly, more (although not purely or absolutely) secularized 
practice was an important transformation. 
Only after Ledi’s influence on Burma did it became common for Burmese laypeople to practice 
and to teach meditation.44 Braun says, “It marked the birth of insight meditation as a popular 
movement that would reshape notions of Buddhism in modern Burma and eventually grow into a 
global phenomenon”45. It remains common today, and this has helped to lead to the development 
of the US mindfulness movement. In return, the US mindfulness movement has helped to shape 
contemporary Asian Buddhisms. 
Before colonialism, Buddhist study, meditation, and various rituals could be found in certain 
(often monastic) contexts. All these practices were intended to help eventually bring about the end 
of suffering. Some Buddhists were so dedicated to these ends that they employed all manner of 
practices, including sexual ones, in order to fulfill their objective, “But premodern Buddhist tantra 
used sexual techniques to reach spiritual goals such as nirvana, whereas the mindful sex movement 
uses spiritual techniques such as meditation to reach sexual goals”46. Before colonialism, all 
Buddhist phenomena bore a relationship to other-worldly Buddhist concerns. Since the advent of 
the US mindfulness movement, Buddhist meditation has been increasingly associated with many 
things other than Buddhism’s highest aims. The appropriation of Buddhist meditation has taken 
place partly in concert with the appropriation of other aspects of Buddhism. 
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The particularities of the transnational portation of aspects of Buddhism has led to some 
people’s very narrow understanding of Buddhism. These misunderstandings sometimes differ 
significantly from pre-19th century (British colonization) conceptions of Burmese Buddhism. 
Today, Asian Buddhisms continue to feel effects from US trends in mindfulness. McMahan says,  
“[A] small minority of western Buddhists has had a great impact on how Buddhism 
is understood in the West and to a significant extent in Asian countries where 
Buddhism is prominent. This is because they have authored best-selling, 
internationally distributed books, gone on lecture tours, and set up their own 
institutions. They are culturally elite, well-educated, well-traveled, and usually from 
economically advantaged backgrounds.47 
So, one can interpret the transcontinental Buddhist situation as having been one that, through 
colonial forces, was pressed into transformation. This led to the appropriation of particular forms 
of Buddhist thoughts and Buddhist practices—some of which had previously been more obscure—
only for these thoughts and practices to undergo further transformations in the US and to 
eventually feed back into Asian Buddhisms. 
The last line of McMahans’s above quotation is interesting. US mindfulness appeals to a 
specific subset of the US population. As McMahan puts it, “[T]he majority of western converts or 
sympathizers in meditative Buddhist traditions [are] white and middle-class”48. The people who 
disseminate mindfulness in the US mostly come from relatively privileged backgrounds, and the 
people who adopt mindfulness practices tend to come from similarly privileged backgrounds. They 
are the people in society who stand to gain the most by the prevailing ideology. Thus, they have 
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the most to gain by reproducing the prevailing ideology, including its associations with capitalism, 
science, rationalism, the autonomous individual, and so on. 
Wilson asserts that there are mindfulness practitioners who hope for social change, but there 
are also those who simply see mindfulness as a means to fulfillment of personal desires. He says, 
“There are laissez-faire mindfulness practitioners who pursue their own practical benefit via 
meditation, and there are ethical mindfulness practitioners for whom mindfulness provides an 
alternative to mainstream American society, a foundation on which to build a healthier and more 
compassionate America, and tools for bringing about that liberal vision”49. Mindfulness, at least, 
might provide some perspective and some expansion of options for bringing about a new iteration 
of society. Yet, for others, mindfulness might be a way of improving one’s focus, of helping one to 
work harder and smarter, of helping to increase one’s bottom line. The tranquilista might just be 
faking it until her meditation practice helps her to make it. The relationship between social change 
and the US mindfulness movement is necessarily complicated. 
Again, though, it is important to be clear about the intentions, so far as we can be. Even if they 
are problematic, the reasons for the kinds of transformations that we are talking about are ones 
that can be understood. As Kabat-Zinn said, the idea for inventing the mindfulness movement 
came out of a genuine altruistic concern for—if nothing else—human life on Earth. That does not 
mean that they did not misunderstand, contort, and profit from this invention. Still, they had in 
mind the welfare of all people. Further, the ambitions of those who appropriated aspects of 
Buddhism—with hopes of widely disseminating them—were not always completely disconnected 
from greater Buddhist ambitions. As Kabat-Zinn explains, his aim was to disseminate a truth that 
would be good for people, i.e. to reduce suffering on Earth. In In the Face of Fear, he says, “One 
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might say that in order for Buddhism to be maximally effective as a dharma vehicle at this stage in 
the evolution of the planet, and for its sorely needed medicine to be maximally effective, it may 
have to give up being Buddhism in any formal religious sense, or at least, give up any attachment 
to it in name or form”50. At least two problems appear here. First, Kabat-Zinn asserts Buddhist 
dharma to be fact. He may be right, but while one definition for dharma is something like “truth,” 
this is a definition immanent to Buddhism—that is, Buddhism asserts the dharma to be fact, but 
this facticity is the case only within a Buddhist cosmovision. Kabat-Zinn’s position is inherently, 
necessarily religious. Kabat-Zinn elsewhere makes this tension even clearer: “The word Dharma 
refers to both the teachings of the Buddha and also the way things are, the fundamental lawfulness 
of the universe. So although the Buddha articulated the Dharma, the Dharma itself can’t be 
Buddhist any more that the law of gravity is English because of Newton or Italian because of 
Galileo. It is a universal lawfulness”51. It may be that the Buddha, Newton, or Galileo are correct 
about some things, but to come to such a conclusion is to take a side in an argument. In a strange 
way, Kabat-Zinn is participating in the kind of faith-based argumentation that, as Hegel concludes, 
helped to lead to increasing secularity in Europe and the US. No wonder Kabat-Zinn so easily 
secularizes and scientizes Buddhism. 
The other problem with what Kabat-Zinn is saying is that it emphasizes a medical 
instrumentality to Buddhism. If this instrumentality is Buddhist, it must be in service to the 
Buddhist ambition to reduce suffering throughout the world in this life and in future lives. In 
Kabat-Zinn’s Contemporary Buddhism, he says, “What better place than a hospital to make the 
dharma available to people in ways that they might possibly understand it... All this to be 
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undertaken, of course, without ever mentioning the word ‘dharma’”52. The dharma is the truth in 
Buddhism, explained and reinforced by all of Buddhist doctrine, including that which Kabat-Zinn 
acknowledges to be left behind in US mindfulness. For Kabat-Zinn, the redefinition of dharma—
again, within the immanent frame—makes sense because it is through that reframing that he and 
others like him are able to spread this redefined dharma—never mind that their goals appear to 
be different from the Buddha’s own. 
To oversimplify, one might see some aspects of Buddhist cultures and some aspects of liberal 
modernity as significantly at odds with each other in particular ways. However, it seems that liberal 
modernity has now simply subsumed some iterations of US mindfulness. Wilson asserts that part 
of the reason for US mindfulness’s lack of subversive efficacy is that US mindfulness has been so 
targeted at so many of the people who seem to benefit most in the US social hierarchy. He says, 
As might be expected from a politics that emerges primarily from white middle-
class America—or in the case of Thich Nhat Hanh and similar figures, has 
especially been embraced by white, middle-class American—mindful civil religion 
does not call for mandatory participation in mindful activities, radical changes to 
the economic structure, aggressive or combative political struggle, or class warfare. 
Rather for many it is apparent that mindful capitalism will be sufficient, as will 
mindful politics, mindful consumption, mindful work, and so on.53 
Regardless of what Kabat-Zinn, Goleman, Hanh, the Dalai Lama, or anyone else says or thinks, 
why should white, middle-class, well-educated, well-paid people from the US determine that their 
society should change in significant ways? Why should their lives necessitate any overwhelming 
concern? Just because someone meditates or elsewise engages in mindfulness does not guarantee 
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that they should become concerned with social issues. Wilson goes on to say, “This is not a call for 
comprehensive wealth redistribution. Most mindfulness authors pin their hopes on a mindful 
capitalism as sufficient to bring about the kinder, wiser society they envision”54. Far from being 
Marxian, these authors might propose that economic change come last instead of first (if at all!). If 
there is any social change to come, it might come after incremental changes to liberal modern 
social forces. 
Many mindfulness authors have proposed that mindfulness could be the catalyst for a better 
world. Wilson explains: “Most mindfulness authors expect change to come about slowly, 
peacefully, through the established political system. They also rarely call for wholesale shifts to a 
totally new form of economic organization. A mindful America will still be a consumerist, capitalist 
nation—it’ll just be a kinder, more ecologically aware one”55. Surely, this is not communist 
revolution or even some 1968 ambition. Still, if there were any evidence that mindfulness were 
creeping into the social consciousness in some way that was slowing down the forces of 
contemporary global capitalism, that evidence seems to be hidden in some cold, dark corner. For 
now, it seems to literally be business as usual. 
US mindfulness itself is a capitalist venture. Wilson says, 
For every practitioner hoping mindfulness will bring about peace on earth, you can 
easily find another whose mindfulness practice doesn’t value anything higher than 
making money through increased attention at work or losing weight through more 
conscious eating habits. Those who do attach morals to or derive values from their 
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mindfulness practice are often people with a connection to a religious tradition, 
especially Buddhism.56  
Regardless of the intentions of US mindfulness’s conceivers, US mindfulness now has no moral 
imperative. Buddhism, on the other hand, commands at least some concern for the welfare of life 
on Earth (as evidenced by the coherence of Buddhist Economics as a Buddhism-based ethical 
prescription for economic activity). Even among lay Buddhists, there has generally been at least 
some role for consciousness of the suffering experienced by life on Earth. Again, US mindfulness 
appears as the desiccated remains of something previously moral and religious. Moral problems 
associated with, and perhaps produced by, liberal modernity persist in the vast US mindfulness 
movement. Some iterations of US mindfulness have been hollowed out so that they no longer 
contain any meaning—moral or otherwise. That the US mindfulness movement was partly 
determined by the British colonization of Burma hardly seems to be a coincidence. 
Previous to Ledi, and through much of the Buddhist world, meditation was not a widespread 
practice. It is telling that the unilateral forces that have so deeply transformed mindfulness practices 
have also been forces that we commonly associate with coloniality and capitalism. Kornfield, a US 
psychologist, determines that his understanding of what is truly meant by Buddhism is more 
accurate than the understandings held by centuries worth of dedicated Buddhist monks. Wilson 
says, 
Kornfield puts a fine point on the idea that a true understanding of Buddhism 
includes the practice of meditation, when he dismisses most Buddhists (and 
Christians) as not really grasping the heart of their religion: “But just as only a small 
minority of the Christians in this country really understand and practice their 
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religion, so too do only a small minority of Asian Buddhists understand and practice 
theirs.”57 
What might be taken from this is that Kornfield assumes there to be an authentic version of 
Buddhism (as well as of Christianity), that he knows what that version is, and that the majority of 
the hundreds of millions of Buddhists throughout history have been getting it wrong. Nevermind 
that Kornfield grew up outside of a Buddhist culture or that he spent far less time learning about 
Buddhism than did the majority of monks and than did plenty of laypeople. If what defines the 
“colonial difference” is a discursive, rationalist, moralist sense through which the other is conceived 
of58, then surely Kornfield’s concern for defining Buddhism and spreading the dharma is colonial. 
Kornfield does not appear to intend any harm; yet, like the colonial project that ostensibly began 
as a project to bring civilization and all good liberal modern things to indigenous peoples59, 
Kornfield does a kind of violence to Buddhism and Buddhists. He defines Buddhism from the 
outside, aiming to help people at home and abroad by giving them a liberalized form of Buddhism. 
Kornfield privileges his interpretation over those of Asian Buddhists, relegating those concerns not 
centered on mindfulness as irrelevant distractions. Kornfield is, however, not alone in this kind of 
bold claim on the true Buddhism. 
Thich Nhat Hanh asserts that mindfulness is at the heart of Buddhism. According to Hanh, 
one is a Buddhist if one is mindful. Wilson, describing Hanh’s position, says, “[A]n insightful, 
mindful Baptist is a Buddhist, while the masses in Southeast Asia devoted to achieving practical 
benefits through support of the monastic sangha and adherence to moral precepts are not 
Buddhist”60. According to Hanh, what is essential to Buddhism is mindfulness. What defines 
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Buddhism, according to Hanh, is an internal mindset. These redefinitions of Buddhism have had 
serious implications on the trajectory of mindfulness. 
In a liberal modern mindfulness environment, Buddhism’s utility lies in its ability to help us to 
fulfill liberal modern ambitions. We liberal moderns might presume liberal modernity’s rightness, 
but for some of us, religion might still help us to unravel some of the mysteries that fall in cracks 
between liberal modernity’s liberal institutional understandings. McMahan says, “In Europe and 
America […] Buddhism has been adapted and infused into preexisting discourses and debates, 
interpreted in terms of modern western categories and assumptions, and called on to confirm or 
refute western philosophies, ideologies, and cultural practices”61. McMahan here makes clear that 
Buddhism, itself, is first modernized—so that it appears legitimate in contemporary discourse—
and then deployed to contribute to liberal modern arguments. There is a tautological mechanics 
at play: Buddhism is illegible until it takes on liberal modern assumptions and, through helping to 
sort through different aspects of modernisms, Buddhism becomes a tool for affirming liberal 
modern assumptions. These liberalizations depend on a logic by which a social body might 
unilaterally attempt to determine the legitimate significance of a phenomenon. 
At the point where Kornfield can declare that most Buddhists are wrong and that he is right, 
he has given himself—and perhaps his colleagues—license to evaluate and reform Buddhism in 
whichever way fits his understanding and his agenda. Buddhism has a long history of 
transformations as it has moved about South and East Asia.62 Of course, Buddhism can change as 
it moves outside of Asia, as well. Braun says “tradition, to survive, must be embraced and cultivated 
creatively”63. The creative cultivations of tradition often require a balance between respect for 
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history and the needs formed by changing circumstances.64 That said, Asian Buddhisms do not 
tend to permit the intermixing of Buddhisms; there are various schools of Buddhist thought, but at 
least until the last few decades, they have been well-established and well-delineated.65 The US 
mindfulness crowd, however, has seen no need to preserve such boundaries. 
In Richard Gilpin’s “The Use of Theravāda Buddhist Practices and Perspectives in 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy,” he tells us of Kabat-Zinn’s position: “As Kabat-Zinn puts 
it, the training in the MBSR program is ‘mostly vipassana practice (in the Theravada sense as 
taught by people like Joseph [Goldstein] and Jack [Kornfield], etc.) with a Zen attitude’”66. There 
appears to be no concern for delineating between different schools of Buddhist thought and 
practice. Not only are any such lines erased, mindfulness practice takes on spiritual practices from 
other religions, as well. Whether or not the US mindfulness movement embodies pure dharma, it 
is not strictly Buddhist. Whether it could be very recognizable to an Asian Buddhist from before a 
few decades ago is another matter. 
What this means, then, is that the politics of mindfulness have appeared in a few ways. First, 
mindfulness is something that was transformed in order to give something to US practitioners and 
US purveyors of mindfulness. Second, mindfulness helps some well-to-do people in the US to 
improve their social positions. Third, US mindfulness sapped liberatory energies from people who 
might otherwise have felt inclined to try to help to change the world. Finally, mindfulness is 
colonized in the sense that colonizers enter into a space that we might call “mindfulness,” alter that 
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space, and benefit by those alterations. It may be that some people in Asia also benefit by these 
alterations, but in some cases, there can be no doubt that the alterations are of a liberal modern 
character. There can also be no doubt that, in some cases, there are people in the US who benefit 
materially by the appropriation and alteration of mindfulness. 
 
Reconsidering Mindfulness 
 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it 
is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him 
irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris 
before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm. — Walter 
Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”67 
 
Mindfulness, through a colonial process, was transformed, emptied out, reformed, and refilled 
with new content. The idea of the epistemological frame through which we view the world—and 
legitimate and delegitimate various aspects of it—is a useful one, but in the case of mindfulness, 
the emptying, transformation, and refilling is something that cannot be fully captured by ideas of 
frames or even ideologies of order. 
While the transformations undertaken by Ledi—for the purpose of preserving Burmese 
Buddhism and Buddhists—were ones that preserved Buddhism as such, the transformations taken 
by people in the US were different. In some sense, one might argue that the difference is something 
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closely associated with all forms of coloniality. Some of the conceivers of mindfulness presumed 
that it was appropriate to unilaterally determine what was meant by “Buddhism.” They 
redetermined the shape of Buddhism and its aspects, renamed what they thought of as Buddhism, 
and they inserted aspects of modernity that had not previously been there. This process is so 
familiar that it is hardly shocking either that mindfulness has become a term that has no necessary, 
stable meaning or that none of mindfulness’s articulations in modernity appear to have any of the 
subversive power that the US mindfulness movement was intended to have. One interesting aspect 
is how the Buddhist conception of long-term contentment is one that appears opposed to the liberal 
modern conception of short-term happiness. But, it is the short-term happiness that appears 
reflected in much of the US mindfulness movement. 
The fact that mindfulness has served to make capitalism and liberal modernity more resilient 
is not a fact that appears novel. Relationships between coloniality, modernity, and capitalism are 
often so close that one might be tempted to ask what the differences are. Certainly, these socio-
cultural forces of the last several centuries tend to rely on one another in somewhat predictable 
ways. In the case of Asian Buddhisms and mindfulness, whatever hopeful differences from 
modernity there might have been, these social currents now appear more like the rest of liberal 
modern society and less potentially subversive to liberal modernity than they previously had. 
 Decolonizing Utopia: 
A Conclusion 
 
I glanced at him, sitting there in our hut with his long haggard face and eyes like a 
kingfisher’s wing, living among us who were not his people, in a country not his 
own, and of a sudden I was moved to ask him if he was alone. […] 
He rose to his feet and without another word was gone, walking with long, quick 
strides and stooping a little as always. A strange nature, only partly within my 
understanding. A man half in shadow, half in light, defying knowledge. — 
Kamala Markandaya, Nectar in a Sieve1 
 
Utopia proves stubborn. I do not think it appropriate to heap too much blame on Schumacher, 
Kabat-Zinn, Goleman, or any of the others. I assume them to be sincere in their efforts to improve 
life for vulnerable people. But, finding utopia might mean escaping liberal modernity; it certainly 
seems to require escaping coloniality, so I cannot imagine leaving behind one and not the other. Is 
there a decolonial way for a liberal modernist to make the world better? I think that might be an 
open question, but there appears to be little evidence that liberal modernity will bring about radical 
social change. What is clearer is that our efforts mostly seem to have failed. Fredric Jameson once 
said of ostensibly subversive arts: “[T]here’s no way to conceive of an art that would be subversive, 
or, there’s no relationship between art and an effective praxis; instead, if subversive art is to have 
appeared, it will only have been acknowledged as such after social upheaval has been effected”2. 
What should be drawn from this quotation is not that nothing can improve the world. Part of what 
                                                        
1 Markandaya, Kamala. Nectar in a Sieve. New York: Signet Classics. 2002. 69-70. 
2 Jameson, Fredric. “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture.” Social Text, 1 (1979): 130-48. 
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Jameson is here saying is that meaning always comes after the event. When we try to change the 
world, we make some guesses as to what might work best, but in actuality, we more often assign 
causes after things change.3 
Any attempt at positive social change can be a complicated, but valuable task. Those who aim 
to improve the world are worth admiration, in my view, but that does not mean that we ever get 
everything right. For anyone to hope for their ideas to remain relevant forty years after being put 
out into the world might seem ambitious, but Schumacher, for one, managed to do that. I would 
suggest that the shortcomings of what Schumacher attempted come in the form of failing to think 
deeply enough and broadly enough, but one can only do so much in a life—especially considering 
the constraints imposed on us by language and culture. Schumacher’s work seems to aim at 
defining the contours of our ravenous desire for greater capacities. I suspect that Schumacher may 
be right to think that this necessitates education and a willingness to sacrifice of oneself for the sake 
of others, for the sake of the whole, and for the sake of one’s long-term well-being, but did 
Schumacher fail? The problems that I highlight reflect tendencies of a different time more than 
they reflect anything about Schumacher in particular. It seems to me that Schumacher was serious 
about wanting to rethink our assumptions, but his project relied on counterproductive views of 
society and social change. He might have been helped by broadening his view to consider the 
perspectives of the Buddhists he admired and how the language he used perhaps made his task 
more difficult. 
                                                        
3 I started by laying out a modern economics project. It is something like a bad joke to make the 
oft-repeated point that macroeconomists always get everything wrong. They draw on whatever 
most recent catastrophe they failed to predict in order to develop a neo-astrological theory, 
assigning precise p-values and relying on complicated linear regression models, and we pat them 
on the back and thank them as we tumble toward another asymmetrical economic cataclysm. 
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Ledi’s legacy is less complicated, except that his innovations led to consequences that he 
certainly did not intend. Buddhism is alive and well in Myanmar, so for that, he should be proud. 
The colonizers are mostly gone (although they reappear in what we call “development”) and Ledi’s 
innovations survive today. But, maybe too well. It is a bit easier to criticize Kabat-Zinn, Goleman, 
Kornfield, and perhaps even Hanh and the Dalai Lama, in some ways. Again, they all seem to 
have good intentions, but like with Schumacher, the unilateral-imposing forces of transformations 
and erasures have done a kind of barbarism against Buddhism and against a way of life. Will there 
ever again be a time that reconstructs the Burmese traditions that preceded British invasion? One 
could rightly point out that we should never expect something like that, but in this case, the point 
is that some things were lost because of colonization and for no other reason. It may be that 
Buddhism will continue to be transformed until Ledi’s greatest fear—the loss of the true dharma—
is effected. Mindfulness has changed the face of Burmese Buddhism and Burmese culture, leading 
to complicated problems—some of which are familiar throughout the world and some of which 
have particularly Burmese specificities. The US mindfulness movement has, in multiple ways 
overgrown anything that it was initially intended to be. Instead of changing society in a positive 
way, it only seems to have convinced would-be rabble-rousers that they are doing their small part 
to be good citizens by living partly-alternative lives, despite that what they might find disheartening 
in liberal modern culture continues on in, in some cases, increasingly pernicious forms. This is 
partly because of a liberal modern conception of desire and ephemeral fulfillment that is allowed 
to grow with the US mindfulness movement. The degree to which Buddhism is erased from US 
mindfulness, and the degree to which anything Buddhist is erased from US mindfulness, is part of 
why the US mindfulness movement is able to fold so neatly into the immanent frame and why it 
helps to protect capitalism and liberal modernity from any threat. This also helps to explain the 
massive industry that has become the US mindfulness movement and its ancillary commodities. 
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Of course, the other consequence of mindfulness that I have not given much discussion to is 
that mindfulness has surely improved the lives of some people. These improvements largely come 
in response to cultural forces that regularly produce suboptimal results for most people. If one is 
the sort of person who is privileged enough to have access to the remedies that mindfulness can 
provide, then they have no reason to act against the harmful nature of liberal modernity and 
capitalism, for example. 
Any system that challenges the status quo must work from within it, and it may be that the 
more popular a movement becomes, the more the movement is likely to cede to prevailing socio-
cultural forces. If we take seriously Vološinov’s assertion that all languages form socially-
constructed systems that depend on ideological particulate4, then trying to change the world 
through language—but from within the language used by those in power—appears to be difficult. 
It is hard to blame utopic colonialists, even if there are movements that seem to find some success 
partly by directing their attention specifically at the terms that are in use, in order that they subvert 
these terms and reconstitute these terms to subvert oppressive socio-cultural forces.5 This is a 
relatively new phenomenon, though. 
If we do not try to reform the language that we deploy while also remaining diligent about 
demanding radical change to the institutions that determine so much of our lives, then our efforts 
may be destined to fall short. If our language conditions us and holds together the socio-cultural 
forces around us, then it may be that the language largely is the problem. It appears, Michael Hardt 
once said6, as a failure of temporal imagination and a failure to consider the revolution in the 
                                                        
4 Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. 
5 The Zapatistas, Black Lives Matter, #NODAPL, and other recent movements quickly come to 
mind as movements that have intentionally sought to rethink specific terms for the sake of effecting 
change.  
6 Hardt, Michael. The Procedures of Love. Germany: Hatje Cantz. 2012. 
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everyday—in the banal. In some sense, this is captured in part of the Zapatistas’ politics: they “walk 
at the pace of the slowest,” “while questioning.” In other words, if at every level of society we can 
think of how our normal lives create privilege and underprivilege, and if we earnestly try to rectify 
those small injustices, this may be a strategy that can have some success for making the world 
better7. Perhaps, it is only when revolution does not appear so revolutionary that it will have 
achieved the highest goals of its most ambitious invokers and, in so doing, decolonize utopia.
                                                        
7 This idea does not only appear in Zapatismo; it also appears in several places in Foucault’s 
writings, like in “Method,” the aforementioned “What is Enlightenment?” as well as in the general 
focus of his œuvre. 
 Epilogue 
 
For a “decolonial critique,” this document focuses a good deal on the US and, in particular, 
on white men. I take this seriously, and I think fair any criticism in this vein. My intention was to 
focus on what I saw as the geographical locus of many of the most important contemporary 
social problems. In my mind, there is no wonder in the seeming pervasion of Jameson’s quotation 
about the end of the earth versus the end of capitalism. So, maybe what I want to say is that it is 
easier to imagine a just, sustainable world without the US than to imagine a just, sustainable 
world that includes the US. It seems clear to me that solutions for ecological devastation, 
inequalities, and other problems are more likely to come from outside the US than from within 
it. The necessary task, then, seems to be that we find ways of convincing those in the US that 
change is required. Still, I could have done all of this while giving more space to people who were 
not white men and to people and places apart from the US. In retrospect, I would have liked this 
project to have better represented a more diverse set of sources. 
Relatedly, I understand that there could be some resistance to my constant reification of, and 
denigration of, liberal modernity in general. Still, I am inclined to interrogate this impulse. I find 
it interesting that we sometimes single out “modernity” as a term that requires explanation. 
Could we not as easily demand that every term both be given specificity and be allowed to have 
multiple meanings1? I wonder what it says about us that we privilege “modernity” in this way. 
Would we do the same for “capitalism?” Modernity and capitalism have brought us some good, 
                                                        
1 Despite that it also puzzles me that some people sometimes seem to be interested in both at the 
same time. I am not sure how one might both give specificity to a term while simultaneously 
allowing for the term to be open-ended, hybrid, multiple, etc. 
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but at huge expense. Personally, I have no interest in redeeming “modernity.” As far as I am 
concerned, we could take the good and articulate it to something else in order to move forward—
no reason to throw the baby in with the dirty bathwater. 
This leads to a question of legitimacy and someone’s right to self-identify. The first example I 
will use is Rachel Dolezal—the woman who claimed (claims?) to be black by virtue of 
transraciality. On one hand, I have no desire to claim that Dolezal is black or transracial; on the 
other, I am not going to proselytize and tell her what she cannot call herself. I could claim to be 
the real Dalai Lama, and one might think, Well, he can call himself whatever he wants, but he doesn’t meet 
my definition. One could adopt a kind of passive disagreement. Anyone can call themselves 
“modern,” and I take no offense to that. I have concerns with people actually demonstrating 
characteristics—some loose and not-obviously-well-organized constellation of forces—that I tie to 
modernity. 
Many people have tried to define “modernity”—to various results. I want to take two 
approaches. First, I want to consider what absolutely presents itself in general use of the word. 
Second, I want to look at a particular definition of “modernity,” and see what is to be gleaned. 
First, modernity seems to clearly be about two things: temporality and value. “Modernity” is a 
comminution; the present is demarcated from the past. This is the term’s historical use and it is 
the colloquial sense that most English-speaking people know. Characteristics of naïve people 
from the past become associated with what some moderns consider to be naïve people of today. 
This naïvete is often associated with people who see the world in an immanent way, who feel 
connected to nature, and who live within humble means. Already, we see “modernity” as 
something associated with time, with value, with self-righteousness, with othering, with pursuit of 
profit. We can think of all the atrocities that seem to have been produced by this constellation of 
conditioning forces. 
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My second strategy is to take seriously Mignolo’s claim that Western modernity is always 
constituted by its long backside that comes in the form that we call “coloniality.” When Mignolo 
describes Vitoria’s framework for civilizing people in the Americas, Mignolo points to the 
rationalist ethical justification for what would become the slaughters of countless intentionally 
othered people. 
“Modernity,” then, might have a lot to do with time, with value, with self-righteousness, with 
othering, with pursuit of profit, with rationality, and with violence. Still, if someone wants to call 
themselves “modern,” I will not go out of my way to discuss merits of the characterization. At the 
same time, I find myself skeptical of leftists who seem to want to redeem something of modernity. 
It may be that they define modernity differently from how I do, but I wonder what the 
motivation might be for preserving something of a status quo that has been rather brutal to a lot 
of people. 
Another important point that I should make would be to more thoroughly situate my 
argument among some similar arguments. Perhaps the most well-known of these might be 
Žižek’s. He argues that Buddhism in the US is basically the kind of individualistic postmodern 
nihilism that can help to perpetuate the present stage of late capitalism. Buddhism in the US, the 
argument goes, is a force by which people are encouraged to turn attention (even more) inward 
so that they might adapt themselves to whatever social conditions are produced. Whether 
someone is oppressed or whether someone witnesses oppression is of no real concern. Instead, 
one need only rein in desires and cultivate happiness in spite of it all. If one is asked to contribute 
to atrocity, then be the best damn atrocity-producer possible, let the past be the past, and learn 
contentment through better understanding of one’s limited, fragmented, contingent reality. In 
some sense, US Buddhism asks that we disclaim any hope to control our lives—a kind of 
deregulation of our own lives. We might respond by pointing out—to ourselves or to 
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whomever—that we are not responsible for the totality of devastation caused in the world. Our 
behaviors are determined by forces already in motion, and we merely go with the consumer 
capitalist flow. At least such an existence might be self-aware in its complicity with the status quo. 
This argument is not all that different from mine. 
This phenomenon has recently come under some scrutiny in Silicon Valley. While I briefly 
mentioned the role of mindfulness in corporate culture, this role seems to be continually 
expanding. James Ponsoldt’s 2017 film, The Circle, partly interrogates the tendency of large tech 
corporations in Northern California that to fully indoctrinate their employees in the bleeding 
edge of neoliberal ideology. In real life, mindfulness is one of many tools that these companies use 
in order to ensure half-sated employees as they perpetuate the San Francisco housing absurdity, 
serious inequalities of outcomes and opportunities across the globe, mass ecological devastation, 
and so on. Between trips to on-campus yoga, fine eateries, and lectures given by people like 
Žižek, himself, these employees often praise their companies for giving them and their families a 
slice of the new American Dream. 
If I were to continue working on this project, I would spend more time looking at the writings 
of women2 and people from outside the US and Europe in order to produce a more complex 
account. In particular, I would focus on what is happening with contemporary Buddhisms 
outside the US. What I wrote depended a good deal on theory, where it could have dedicated 
more attention to Buddhisms and even to analyses of contemporary Buddhisms. My argument 
could have been more forceful if a more prominent role had been given to contemporary 
corporate culture’s relationship to mindfulness. Various forces helped to set conditions for the US 
                                                        
2 In fact, many women who write about contemporary politics, social movements, and even 
network theory have had something to say about Buddhism’s potential for solving social problems. 
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mindfulness movement, and I think that it would be useful to think more about the roles of those 
conditioning forces.
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